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Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption:         




The 1994 season overflowed with the best that baseball 
has to offer.1  Fans were treated to some of the closest and 
most exciting pennant races in recent memory.2  An infec-
tious excitement permeated the baseball subculture, as sev-
eral of the sport’s oldest records faced serious challenges for 
the first time in years.3 
August 11, 1994:  115 games into the season, Matt Wil-
liams belts his forty-third home run, keeping him on a pace 
to match Yankee Roger Maris’ record of sixty-one home runs 
over a 162 game season.4  Ken Griffey, Jr. crushes a grand 
slam for his fortieth home run of the year.5  Tony Gwynn 
goes three for five6 and raises his batting average to .394, the 
best in the majors and the highest major league mark since 
Boston’s Ted Williams batted .406 in 1941.7  Albert Belle and 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University School of Law.  This Note is 
dedicated to my family for a lifetime of love and support.  I would like to thank 
Mark Salzberg for his invaluable comments and insights.  Special thanks to Paula 
and Kyra Sica, for their patience and understanding, and for making it all worth 
while. 
1. See, e.g., Michael Wilbon, Baseball Gets Charged With a Costly Error, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 13, 1994, at F1; Bob Nightengale, Strikingly Disappointed:  Their Dream 
Season Becomes a Nightmare, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1994, at C1. 
2. See Robert McG. Thomas Jr., If It’s Over, ‘94 Season Had Tight Races and In-
dividual Accomplishments, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at B11; Wilbon, supra note 1, 
at F1; Nightengale, supra note 1, at C1. 
3. See Wilbon, supra note 1, at F1; Nightengale, supra note 1, at C1; Thomas, 
supra note 2, at B11. 
4. Thomas, supra note 2, at B11. 
5. Id. 
6. Gwynn had three hits in five times at bat.  Id. 
7. Id. 
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Frank Thomas continue their pursuit of the first major 
league Triple Crown8 since Carl Yastrzemski of the Boston 
Red Sox accomplished the feat in 1967.9  Randy Johnson 
strikes out fifteen batters, raising his major league leading 
total to 204.10  The Yankees’ Paul O’Neill chases his first bat-
ting title, leading the American league with a .359 batting 
average.11  Greg Maddox wins his sixteenth game of the sea-
son and lowers his Earned Run Average12 to an astounding 
1.56 for 202 innings.13  Three of the six major league divi-
sions boast tight races for first place, and the final weeks of 
the season seem destined for an exciting playoff push.14  On 
August 11, however, there was very little excitement among 
baseball fans; rather, they felt a sense of foreboding worry.15 
August 12, 1994:  at 12:45 A.M. E.S.T., the game between 
 
8. Id.  The Triple Crown is a term used to describe a player who finishes the 
season with the highest marks in three categories:  batting average, home runs, 
and runs batted in (“R.B.I.s”).  Id.  Belle was second in batting average (.357), 
third in home runs (36), and tied for third in R.B.I.s (101).  Id.  Thomas was third 
in batting average (.353), second in home runs (38), and tied for third in R.B.I.s 




12. Earned Run Average (“ERA”) is a pitcher’s statistic representing the av-
erage number of runs legitimately scored from his deliveries per full nine-inning 
game.  PAUL DICKSON, THE DICKSON BASEBALL DICTIONARY 143 (1989).  ERA is cal-
culated by dividing the number of earned runs by the number of innings 
pitched, then multiplying by nine.  Id.  Along with won-lost record, nearly all 
baseball enthusiasts consider ERA to be the mark of a pitcher’s efficiency over 
the course of a season.  Id.  Generally, an ERA of under 3.00 is considered good.  
Id. 
13. Thomas, supra note 2, at B11. 
14. Id. 
15. See, e.g., John Weyler, Life Will Go On, but Maybe Not at Big A.  Baseball:  
Fans, Players, and Stadium Workers Are All Making Strike Plans, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 
1994 (Orange County edition), at A1; Jack Curry, With End in Sight, Key and Yanks 
Take a Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1994, at B13; Mary Ann Hudson, Dodgers Get 
a Big Rally After a Dose of Reality, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1994, at C1; Jennifer Frey, In 
Mets’ Locker Room, the Decor Was Strictly Business, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1994, at 
B15; cf. George Grella, Perspective on Baseball; A Religion That Goes to Our Roots; 
The Game is So Much More Than the Greed and Arrogance of Its Major League Players 
and Owners, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1994, at B7 (discussing the cultural significance 
of baseball in America). 
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the Oakland Athletics and Seattle Mariners ends and the Ma-
jor League Baseball Players Association (“MLBPA”) strike of-
ficially begins.16  Thirty-three days later, the World Series, 
which had survived two world wars, the depression, and an 
earthquake, was canceled.17 
The cancellation of the 1994 World Series is another chap-
ter in the saga of employment relations in professional 
sports.18  Since the inception of team sports, owners and 
players have been at odds in defining the terms of their em-
ployment relationship.19  The resolution of these disputes is 
governed by contract, antitrust, and labor law.20  In baseball, 
these fields of law cordoned themselves into three distinct 
phases of legal development; in football, however, these le-
 
16. Baseball’s Last Day, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at B10. 
17. Murray Chass, Owners Terminate Season, Without the World Series, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at A1; Ross Newhan, Baseball Season, Series Canceled, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at A1. 
18. See discussion infra parts I-II (discussing the development of employ-
ment relations between owners and players in professional baseball and foot-
ball). 
19. Id. 
20. See ROBERT BERRY ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 23 
(1986); see generally, James R. Devine, Baseball’s Labor Wars in Historical Context:  
The 1919 Chicago White Sox as a Case Study in Owner Player Relations, 5 MARQ. 
SPORTS L.J. 1 (1994); Robert McCormick, Baseball’s Third Strike:  The Triumph of 
Collective Bargaining in Professional Baseball, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1131 (1982); Mitch 
Truelock, Free Agency in the NFL:  Evolution or Revolution?, 47 SMU L. REV. 1917 
(1994); Thane N. Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports 
Leagues Revisited:  Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 729 
(1987); John Dodge, Regulating the Baseball Monopoly:  One Suggestion for Govern-
ing the Game, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 35 (1995); Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports 
Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1989); Gary R. Roberts, Sports League Restraints on 
the Labor Market:  The Failure of Stare Decisis, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 337 (1986); Joseph 
P. Bauer, Antitrust and Sports:  Must Competition on the Field Displace Competition 
in the Marketplace?, 60 TENN. L. REV. 263 (1993); Stephanie L. Taylor, Baseball as an 
Anomaly:  American Major League Baseball Antitrust Exemption—Is the Australian 
Model a Solution?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 359 (1995); Peter N. Katz, A History of 
Free Agency in the United States and Great Britain:  Who’s Leading the Charge?, 15 
COMP. LAB. L.J. 371 (1994); William S. Robbins, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption—A 
Corked Bat for Owners?, 55 LA. L. REV. 937 (1995); Shant H. Chalian, Fourth And 
Goal:  Player Restraints in Professional Sports, A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 67 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 593 (1993) (discussing one or more of the areas of law that govern 
the resolution of disputes between owners and players). 
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gal areas have been intertwined throughout the develop-
ment of the employment relationship between owners and 
players.21 
During the first phase of employment relations in base-
ball, contract principles defined the employment relation-
ship between owners and players.22  Beginning with the 
formation of the first baseball leagues in the 1870s,23 owners 
used these principles to obtain injunctions which prevented 
their contracted players from performing in rival leagues.24  
The earliest decisions in this phase favored the players.25  In 
Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing26 and Metropolitan Exhibi-
tion Co. v. Ward,27 for example, courts refused to enjoin ball-
players from playing in the fledgling Brotherhood League.28  
In contrast, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Phila-
delphia Ball Club v. Lajoie29 that the one-sided player contract 
of future Hall-of-Famer Napoleon Lajoie was justified be-
cause his services were of such a unique character, and so 
difficult to replace, that their loss would produce irreparable 
injury to his team’s owner.30  Although there were addi-
 
21. See discussion infra parts I-II (discussing the development of employ-
ment relations in professional baseball and football). 
22. See discussion infra part I.A (discussing the contracts phase of develop-
ment in professional baseball). 
23. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 24.  The first professional Baseball League, 
the National League, was formed in 1876.  Id. at 47.  The first challenge to the Na-
tional League’s monopoly occurred in 1882, with the formation of the American 
Association league.  Id. at 48.  The creation of the American Association ignited 
the first sports disputes dealing with contract breaches, as players under contract 
in the National League reneged on their contractual obligations to play in the 
American Association league.  Id. 
24. See discussion infra part I.A (discussing the contracts phase of develop-
ment in professional baseball). 
25. See discussion infra part I.A (discussing the contracts phase of develop-
ment in professional baseball). 
26. 42 F. 198 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890). 
27. 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1890). 
28. See discussion infra notes 101-14 and accompanying text (discussing Ew-
ing and Ward). 
29. 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (Sup. Ct. 1902). 
30. Id. at 217, 51 A. at 974; see infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining the court’s decision in Lajoie). 
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tional challenges during the contracts phase,31 the standards 
set by Lajoie prevailed.32  As a result, the injunction became 
the owners’ usual remedy and a significant roadblock to 
player mobility.33 
During baseball’s second phase, courts applied antitrust 
principles to baseball.34  Initially, courts debated whether 
such principles applied to professional sports.35  For exam-
ple, in American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase,36 the 
New York Supreme Court recognized that the business of 
baseball was a monopoly, but concluded that there was no 
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act37 (“Sherman Act” or 
“Act”), because baseball was not interstate commerce38 for 
the purposes of the Act.39  Likewise, in Federal Baseball Club of 
Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,40 the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that baseball was a 
monopoly, and similarly held that the sport was exempt 
from antitrust law.41  In so holding, the Court reasoned that 
baseball was not interstate commerce for the purposes of the 
Sherman Act.42  The Supreme Court’s holding in Federal 
Baseball still stands today, despite contrary rulings from the 
 
31. BERRY, supra note 20, at 27; see, e.g., Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168 
(W.D. Mich. 1914), aff’d, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir. 1914); Brooklyn Baseball Club v. 
McGuire, 116 F. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1902); Connecticut Professional Sports Corp. v. 
Heyman, 276 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
32. BERRY, supra note 20, at 27. 
33. Id. 
34. See discussion infra part I.B (discussing the antitrust phase of employ-
ment relations in professional baseball). 
35. See discussion infra part I.B.2.a (discussing the evolution of baseball’s 
antitrust exemption). 
36. 86 Misc. 441 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914). 
37. Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)).  See discussion infra part I.B.1 (dis-
cussing the Sherman Act). 
38. See infra note 171 (explaining the Supreme Court’s definition of interstate 
commerce in United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895)). 
39. Chase, 86 Misc. at 459. 
40. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
41. Id. at 208-09. 
42. Id. 
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Second Circuit on two subsequent occasions.43 
 During baseball’s third and current phase of legal de-
velopment, courts have employed labor law principles to de-
fine the relationship between owners and players.44  
Throughout this period, ballplayers have united and utilized 
labor law to advance their interests.45  Owners and players 
have primarily settled their disputes through either arbitra-
tion, collective bargaining negotiations, or work stoppages.46  
During this phase, the players obtained numerous conces-
sions from the owners, including escalated free agency,  
elimination of the reserve rule,47 increased minimum sala-
ries, and elevated pension benefits.48 
In football, the conflict between owners and players de-
veloped in a significantly different manner than in base-
ball.49  In contrast to baseball, the legal development of the 
employment relationship in football was characterized by an 
amalgamation of legal fields.50  Initial disputes between 
owners and players focused on the league’s unsuccessful at-
 
43. See discussion infra part I.B.2.c (discussing the subsequent challenges to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Baseball). 
44. See discussion infra part I.C (discussing the labor phase of development 
in professional baseball). 
45. See discussion infra part I.C (discussing the labor phase of development 
in professional baseball). 
46. See discussion infra part I.C.2 (discussing the history of employment re-
lations between owners and players during the labor phase of development). 
47. Professional Baseball Clubs, 66 L.A. 101 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.).  Professional 
baseball’s reserve system, commonly referred to as the reserve rule or reserve 
clause, is a complex system of rules and agreements between team owners relat-
ing to the objective of retaining exclusive control over the service of their players.  
See id. at 103-04.  The reserve system is enforced to preserve the ability to disci-
pline players, maintain financial stability, and promote competitive balance 
among teams.  Id.  The reserve system accomplishes these goals by restricting 
players’ ability to work for different teams.  Id. 
48. See discussion infra part I.C.2 (discussing the history of employment re-
lations during the labor phase). 
49. See discussion infra part II (discussing the development of employment 
relations in professional football). 
50. See discussion infra part II (discussing the development of employment 
relations in professional football). 
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tempts to obtain the same antitrust immunity that baseball 
enjoyed.51  The first such case, United States v. National Foot-
ball League,52 occurred in 1953.53  In National Football League, a 
Pennsylvania federal court held that the Sherman Act ap-
plied to professional football.54  The Supreme Court adopted 
the National Football League rationale in it’s 1957 decision, Ra-
dovich v. National Football League,55 holding that the antitrust 
exemption established in Federal Baseball was expressly lim-
ited to professional baseball.56  Despite these victories, how-
ever, the owners restricted player mobility with devices such 
as the Rozelle Rule57 and the amateur draft.58  To overcome 
these obstacles, football players unionized and continued to 
challenge the league on antitrust grounds.59 
Football players utilized the same union tactics as base-
ball players, but their efforts were bolstered by the applica-
bility of antitrust law to the league.60  From the inception of 
the National Football League Players’ Association 
(“NFLPA”) in 1956, the organization has utilized strikes, col-
lective bargaining, and antitrust law to challenge allegedly 
 
51. See discussion infra part II.A (discussing the NFL’s unsuccessful at-
tempts to obtain antitrust immunity). 
52. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 321, 327-28, 330. 
55. 352 U.S. 445 (1957). 
56. Id. at 451. 
57. See discussion infra notes 455-66 and accompanying text (discussing 
football’s Rozelle Rule). 
58. See infra notes 498-502 and accompanying text (discussing the invalida-
tion of the draft on antitrust grounds).  The amateur draft is a selection process 
by which each team, in an order dictated by record (the team with the worst re-
cord in the previous season picks first; the league champion picks last), chooses 
amateur athletes, in whom they hold an exclusive bargaining right for his ser-
vices.  Smith v. Pro Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 741 (D.D.C. 1976), modified, 593 
F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  A drafted player who is unable to reach an agreement 
with the team holding the rights to his services cannot play in the league.  Id. 
59. See discussion infra part II.C (discussing players’ challenges to restrictive 
league practices). 
60. See discussion infra part II.A (explaining how professional football was 
found to be subject to antitrust constraints). 
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restrictive league practices.61  In fact, the majority of player 
victories have come by way of successful antitrust chal-
lenges.62  For example, in Mackey v. National Football League,63 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the Rozelle 
Rule,64 finding that the rule violated antitrust law.65  Simi-
larly, in Smith v. Pro Football,66 a federal court in the District 
of Columbia invalidated the amateur draft on antitrust 
grounds.67 
Despite these antitrust victories, however, football play-
ers have been significantly less successful than baseball 
players in bargaining with the owners.68  Although player 
salaries in both sports have steadily increased, football own-
ers have successfully implemented a salary cap,69 which has 
retarded salary growth and hindered player mobility.70  Crit-
ics attribute these management successes to football owners’ 
ability to utilize the nonstatutory labor exemption,71 which 
extends limited antitrust immunity to agreements that are 
the product of collective bargaining between labor unions 
and nonunion employer groups.72 
 
61. See discussion infra part II.C (discussing NFLPA efforts to challenge re-
strictive league practices). 
62. See discussion infra part II.A.C (discussing the initial determination that 
antitrust constraints applied to professional football and discussing subsequent 
successful antitrust challenges to restrictive league practices). 
63. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). 
64. See infra notes 455-66 and accompanying text (discussing football’s Ro-
zelle Rule). 
65. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 622. 
66. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), modified, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
67. Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 743. 
68. See discussion infra part II.C (explaining the history of collective bargain-
ing negotiations between owners and players in professional football). 
69. See infra notes 599-600 and accompanying text (discussing the salary cap 
created by the 1993 collective bargaining agreement). 
70. Brian E. Dickerson, The Evolution of Free Agency in the National Football 
League:  Unilateral and Collective Bargaining Restrictiveness, 3 SPORTS L.J. 165, 201-03 
(1996); see infra notes 599-609 and accompanying text (discussing the adverse ef-
fects of the salary cap on player salaries, mobility, and marketability). 
71. See infra note 415 (explaining the nonstatutory labor exemption). 
72. See discussion infra part II.B (discussing the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion). 
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The history of employment relations in American profes-
sional sports details the players’ struggle to free themselves 
from the burdens of a reserve system,73 and the owners’ at-
tempts to hold on to absolute control over the employment 
relationship.74  A majority of the scholarship on this subject 
has focused on baseball’s antitrust exemption.75  In fact, nu-
merous writers have proposed that the exemption be limited 
or repealed, either through legislation or court decision.76  
These arguments, however, rest on the presumption that the 
exemption plays an active role in present-day employment 
relations in professional sports.77 
This Note argues that a historical analysis of employment 
relations in professional baseball and football demonstrates 
that baseball’s antitrust exemption no longer plays a signifi-
cant role in defining the legal status of players and owners in 
 
73. See supra note 47 (discussing baseball’s reserve rule); see infra notes 455-
66 and accompanying text (discussing football’s Rozelle Rule). 
74. See discussion infra parts I-II (discussing the development of employ-
ment relations between owners and players in professional baseball and foot-
ball). 
75. See supra note 20 (demonstrating the large amount of scholarship on this 
issue). 
76. See generally, Latour Rey Lafferty, The Tampa Bay Giants and the Continu-
ing Vitality of Major League Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption:  A Review of Piazza v. 
Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993), 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1271 
(1994) (arguing for limitation of baseball’s exemption to antitrust violations in-
volving the labor market and player restrictions); Larry C. Smith, Beyond Peanuts 
and Cracker Jack:  The Implications of Lifting Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 67 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 113 (1996) (proposing termination of baseball’s exemption or limi-
tation of it to labor disputes); H. Ward Classen, Three Strikes and You’re Out:  An 
Investigation of Professional Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 21 AKRON L. REV. 369 
(1988) (proposing termination of antitrust exemption as economically inefficient 
and unconstitutional); Robert G. Berger, Essay, After the Strikes:  A Reexamination 
of Professional Baseball’s Exemption From the Antitrust Laws, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 209 
(1983) (arguing that there is no compelling public policy for retaining baseball’s 
immunity); see also generally, Rosenbaum, supra note 20; Dodge, supra note 20; 
Katz, supra note 20; Ross, supra note 20; Roberts, supra note 20; Bauer, supra note 
20; Taylor, supra note 20. 
77. See, e.g., Mark T. Gould, Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption:  The Pitch Gets 
Closer and Closer, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 273 (1995); Alison Cackowski, Congress 
Drops the Ball Again:  Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Remains in Place, 5 J. ART. & 
ENT. L. 147 (1994). 
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baseball labor negotiations.  Furthermore, this Note argues 
that collective bargaining and labor law constitute the legal 
foundation governing employment relations in all profes-
sional sports today.78  Part I of this Note analyzes the history 
of employment relations in professional baseball in each of 
its three phases of legal development:  contract, antitrust, 
and labor law.  Part II examines the development of the em-
ployment relationship in professional football.  Part II also 
illustrates the impact of the applicability of antitrust law on 
the development of the league and on collective bargaining 
between players and owners.  Part III compares the history 
of the development of employment relations in football and 
baseball, and analyzes the current state of antitrust law in 
the courts, as it applies to professional sports.  In addition, 
Part III argues that the antitrust exemption has been a dead 
letter in employment relations since 1972.  Finally, this Note 
concludes that professional baseball no longer holds an ad-
vantage over other sports in the area of employment rela-
tions, because the present and future driving force behind 
employment relations in all professional sports is collective 
bargaining and labor law. 
I. THE HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL 
 BASEBALL 
In order to fully understand the current legal status of 
professional baseball, it is essential to first examine the 
sport’s employment relations history.  This part provides an 
overview of each of the three phases of baseball’s legal de-
velopment.  First, this part discusses the contracts phase, 
during which the attempts by both owners and players to 
 
78. The clearest way to illustrate these differences is through a direct com-
parison of the evolution of the employment relationship in baseball and a non-
antitrust exempt sport.  This Note discusses football for the purposes of this 
comparison for two reasons.  First, football came into being in 1920, only two 
years prior to the decision in Federal Baseball.  Second, the development of foot-
ball’s employment relationship starkly demonstrates the effects of antitrust law 
with which baseball was not encumbered. 
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control their relationship were grounded in contract law.  
Second, this part analyzes the antitrust phase, focusing on 
the development of baseball’s antitrust exemption.  Finally, 
this part examines the labor phase, the third and current pe-
riod of legal development in baseball.  During this current 
phase, player victories in arbitration hearings, court, and col-
lective bargaining negotiations have brought employment 
relations in professional baseball completely under the juris-
diction of labor law. 
A.  Contracts Phase 
Since the first athlete was paid to play baseball,79 the 
sport has endured labor difficulties.80  The first significant 
labor movement in professional sports occurred in 1885,81 
with the formation of the Brotherhood of Professional Base 
Ball Players (“Brotherhood”).82  The players formed the 
Brotherhood in response to the National League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs’ (“National League”) 83 administration, 
which, they believed, denied them any control over their 
employment.84  The Brotherhood’s two primary grievances 
 
79. The first professional baseball team, the Cincinnati Red Stockings, was 
formed in 1869.  BERRY, supra note 20, at 47.  The Red Stockings were not part of a 
league; rather, they toured the country and “took on all comers.”  Id. 
80. See McCormick, supra note 20, at 1139-46; BERRY, supra note 20, at 23-27. 
81. KENNETH M. JENNINGS, BALLS AND STRIKES 3 (1990).  The first formal Base-
ball league, the National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs, was formed in 
1876.  Id. 
82. Id.  The Brotherhood was constituted with the following charter: 
We, the undersigned, professional base ball players, recognizing the 
importance of united effort and impressed with its necessity in our be-
half, do form ourselves this day into an organization to be known as the 
‘Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players.’  The objects we seek to 
accomplish are: 
To protect and benefit ourselves collectively and individually. 
To promote a high standard of professional conduct. 
To foster and encourage the interest of . . . Base Ball. 
Id. at 4. 
83. The National League, like all other sports leagues, is the combination of 
individual teams to maximize income and profits by eliminating internal compe-
tition for producers (players) and consumers (fans).  BERRY, supra note 20, at 5. 
84. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 24, 51; McCormick, supra note 20, at 1142; 
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were the $3,000 maximum yearly salary and the reserve 
rule.85  The reserve rule, conceived in 1879 and since drafted 
into all standard player contracts, was an agreement among 
the eight National League clubs not to employ any player 
who was reserved by another team.86  The rule granted each 
team the unilateral right to reserve a player, and thus con-
tractually bind him to that particular team.87  Once a team 
“reserved” a player, no other team would employ him, even 
if he retired and returned to the sport.88  Furthermore, the 
team could hold the player as long as it desired, and could 
release him at any time, either with or without cause; the 
player, on the other hand, could never play for another team, 
regardless of his wish to do so.89  Consequently, a one-year 
contract to play baseball for a team could potentially bind a 
player to that team for life.90  Professional baseball players 
quickly recognized that, unless they united, the team owners 
would continue to exercise unilateral control over their pro-
                                                                                                                                  
JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 3-7. 
85. See McCormick, supra note 20, at 1142; BERRY, supra note 20, at 51. 
86. JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 4. 
87. The reserve rule created an unusual contractual duty for reserved play-
ers.  Reserved players whose contracts had expired were forced to re-sign con-
tracts with the team that reserved them.  If a reserved player refused to re-sign, 
he could not sign with any other team.  See McCormick, supra note 20, at 1141; 
JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 4-5. 
88. See JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 5. 
89. McCormick, supra note 20, at 1141-42; see JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 4-5. 
90. JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 4-5; see McCormick, supra note 20, at 1142.  
John Montgomery Ward, an accomplished baseball player of the era and early 
leader of the Brotherhood compared the reserve rule to a fugitive slave law in an 
open letter to the president of the National League: 
There is now no escape for the player.  If he attempts to elude the opera-
tion of the rule, he becomes at once a professional outlaw, and the hand 
of every club is against him.  He may be willing to play elsewhere for 
less salary, he may be unable to play, or, for other reasons, may retire 
for a season or more, but if ever he reappears as a professional ball-
player it must be at the disposition of his former club.  Like a fugitive 
slave law, the reserve-rule denies him a harbor or a livelihood, and car-
ries him back, bound and shackled, to the club from which he attempted 
to escape.  We have, then, the curious result of a contract which on its 
face is for seven months being binding for life. 
Jennings, supra note 81, at 5 (emphasis added). 
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fessional destinies.91 
By 1887, the strength of the Brotherhood had grown suf-
ficiently that it sought formal recognition by the owners.92  
Although the Brotherhood negotiated with the owners, it 
made little progress.93  In 1889, player resentment of owner-
ship grew so great that the Brotherhood formed a rival 
league, the National Brotherhood League (“Brotherhood 
League”).94  The ensuing defection of players to the new 
league triggered a flood of litigation, which focused on con-
tract law.95 
National League owners first sought restraining orders 
against the players’ participation in the Brotherhood 
League.96  The owners based these actions on the reserve 
 
91. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 24, 51; JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 3-7; 
McCormick, supra note 20, at 1142-43. 
92. JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 5. 
93. Id. at 5-6. 
94. Id. at 6. 
95. BERRY, supra note 20, at 24. 
96. It is clear that no court will order an employee or other person who is 
under contract to render personal services to perform.  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1979); Pingley v. Brunson, 252 S.E.2d 560 (S.C. 
1979) (reversing lower court order of performance of service contract).  Such an 
order runs the risk of violating the involuntary servitude clause of the thirteenth 
amendment.  See People v. Lavender, 398 N.E.2d 530 (N.Y. 1979); Robert S. Ste-
vens, Involuntary Servitude by Injunction:  The Doctrine of Lumley v. Wagner Con-
sidered, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 235 (1921).  Although a court may not order performance 
of a personal service contract, it may enjoin a defendant from working for a 
competitor if such an injunction will not indirectly enforce performance by leav-
ing the defendant without other means of earning a living.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(2) cmt.a (1979); see Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 
687 (1852).  The theory is that the court is enforcing an express or implied nega-
tive covenant not to work for competitors during the contract term.  JOHN D. 
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 667 (3d ed. 1987).  That 
type of injunction generally is granted in situations where the employee’s ser-
vices are unique and extraordinary, and the loss of such services causes the em-
ployer irreparable harm.  See David Tannenbaum, Enforcement of Personal Service 
Contracts in the Entertainment Industry, 42 CAL. L. REV. 18, 21 (1954); Bergman & 
Rosenthal, Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts in the Entertainment Industry, 7 
BEVERLEY HILLS B.A. J. 49, 53 (1973); James T. Brennan, Injunction Against Profes-
sional Athletes Breaching their Contracts, 34 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 64 (1967).  Under the 
present standard in professional sports, all professional athletes are regarded as 
possessing unique and extraordinary skill, thus permitting owners to readily ob-
    
308 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:295 
clauses standard in all player contracts.97  The primary issue 
was whether the owners were entitled to injunctive relief to 
force the players to return to their original teams.98  In order 
to resolve this issue, the courts had to first address the en-
forceability of the contracts.99  Specifically, courts examined 
the reserve clauses to determine if they met the contractual 
requirements of definiteness and evinced a sufficient mutu-
ality of obligation.100 
The first two decisions both resulted in victories for the 
players.  In Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing,101 the South-
ern District of New York denied the owner’s request to en-
join a player from leaving the National League and playing 
in the Brotherhood League.102  The Ewing court held that the 
                                                                                                                                  
tain restraining orders.  See, e.g., Central N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v. Barnet, 181 
N.E.2d 506 (Ohio C.P. 1961); Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 
S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). 
97. BERRY, supra note 20, at 24. 
98. See Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890); 
Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Philadelphia 
Ball Club v. Hallman, 8 Pa. C. 57 (1890); American Ass’n Base-Ball Club of Kan-
sas City v. Pickett, 8 Pa. C. 232 (1890). 
99. See Ewing, 42 F. at 200-02; see also Ward, 9 N.Y.S. at 779; Hallman, 8 Pa. C. 
at 57; Pickett, 8 Pa. C. at 232. 
100. See Ewing, 42 F. at 200-02; see also Ward, 9 N.Y.S. at 779; Hallman, 8 Pa. 
C. at 57; Pickett, 8 Pa. C. at 232. 
101. 42 F. 198 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890). 
102. See id. at 199.  Although the Ewing court refused to grant the injunction, 
it espoused the doctrine of enforcement of an implied negative covenant through 
injunction: 
The doctrine is now generally recognized that, while a court of equity 
will not ordinarily attempt to enforce contracts which cannot be carried 
out by the machinery of a court, like that involved in the present case, it 
may nevertheless practically accomplish the same end by enjoining the 
breach of a negative promise, and this power will be exercised when-
ever the contract is one of which the court would direct specific per-
formance, if it could practically compel its observance by the party re-
fusing to perform through a decree for specific performance.  It is 
indispensable . . . that [the contract] be one for the breach of which 
damages would not afford an adequate compensation to the plaintiff.  It 
must be one in which the plaintiff comes into court with clean hands, 
and which is not so oppressive as to render it unjust to the defendant to 
enforce it. 
Id. 
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reserve clause103 failed for indefiniteness; that is, the clause 
failed to provide a definite understanding of the parties’ re-
ciprocal obligations.104  In so holding, the court reasoned that 
the phrase, “right to reserve,” held no meaning that could be 
defined without extrinsic sources.105  Furthermore, the court 
stated that if the parties intended to create a condition by 
which the team could renew the player’s contract for a sec-
ond season—with the same rights and obligations as those 
for the first season—the parties could have easily and 
equivocally expressed that intention in the contract.106  Con-
sequently, the court held that because the meaning of the 
phrase, “right to reserve,” was left wholly to implication, the 
contract failed for indefiniteness.107 
In Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward,108 John Ward simi-
larly defeated his team’s request for a state court injunction 
on the grounds that the reserve clause was indefinite.109  The 
Ward court held that the contract failed for lack of mutual-
 
103. The reserve clause is reprinted in the opinion: 
Article 18.  It is further understood and agreed that the [team] shall 
have the right to ‘reserve’ the [player] for the season next ensuing the 
[last contracted season], herein provided, and that said right and privi-
lege is hereby accorded to [the owner] upon the following conditions, 
which are to be taken and construed as conditions precedent to the ex-
ercise of such extraordinary rights or privileges, viz.:  (1) That the 
[player] shall not be reserved at a salary less than that mentioned in the 
20th paragraph herein, except by the consent of the [player]; (2) that the 
[player], if he be reserved by the [owner] for the next ensuing season, 
shall not be one of more than 14 players then under contract—that is, 
that the right of reservation shall be limited to that number of players, 
and no more. 
Id. at 200 (emphasis added). 
104. See id. at 201.  To be enforceable, a contract must embody the definite 
understanding of the parties to it in respect to their reciprocal rights and obliga-
tions; in short, the understanding of the parties must be reasonably certain.  See 
id. at 203. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 201-02. 
108. 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1890). 
109. Id. at 782. 
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ity110 because the team could release Ward on ten days no-
tice, but had the right to retain the player for an indefinite 
period of time.111  The Ward court reasoned that this concen-
tration of power in one party to a contract could lead to great 
inequities.112  In this case, for example, the club could hold 
Ward until it was too late for him to reasonably gain other 
employment, and then release him without further obliga-
tion.113  The Ward court concluded that this drastic imbalance 
of the parties’ obligations constituted a lack of mutuality, 
and thus was fatal to the owner’s claim for injunctive re-
lief.114 
Baseball historian Robert Berry, however, concluded that 
the seemingly substantial player victories in Ewing, Ward, 
and several other cases,115 were, in fact, hollow.116  Although 
it drew more fans than the National League,117 the Brother-
hood lasted only one season.118  Ewing, Ward, and the rest of 
the Brotherhood were forced to return to the National 
 
110. The doctrine of mutuality states that for a bilateral contract to be en-
forceable, both parties to the contract must supply adequate consideration.  
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 96, §§ 4-12, at 225. 
111. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. at 783. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 783-84.  The court in Ward only considered whether a preliminary 
injunction should be issued.  There was never a full trial on the legal issues.  Id. 
at 781. 
115. There were other lawsuits filed against players leaving the National 
League and American Association for the Players league.  See, e.g., Hallman, 8 Pa. 
C. 57; cf. Pickett, 8 Pa. C. 232 (granting team injunction that was ignored by 
player and never enforced). 
116. BERRY, supra note 20, at 25. 
117. The Brotherhood drew 908,887 fans for 532 games and the National 
League drew 813,678 fans for 540 games.  JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 6; see also 
McCormick, supra note 20, at 1143. 
118. JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 6.  The Brotherhood failed for a number of 
reasons:  (1) the owners of the National League spent about four million dollars 
to bankrupt the Brotherhood; (2) the Brotherhood played their season at the 
same time as the National League; (3) financial backers for the Brotherhood were 
quick to remove their financial support at the first sign that they might lose some 
money; and (4) the press appeared to favor the National League.  Id. 
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League for the remainder of their respective careers.119  Ul-
timately, the collapse of the Brotherhood League brought an 
end to collective player actions for the next ten years.120 
In 1900, the birth of the American League of Professional 
Base Ball (“American League”) triggered another wave of 
litigation.121  The National League, which had operated un-
opposed since 1891,122 was faced with the renewed problem 
of players defecting to a rival league.123  Once again, the 
league’s basic operating provisions were called into ques-
tion; this time, however, the league prevailed in the courts. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Philadel-
phia Ball Club v. Lajoie124 is the longest lasting precedent to 
come out of this second wave of litigation.125  The case arose 
when Napoleon Lajoie left the National League to play in the 
new American League.126  Seeking to keep him in the Na-
tional League, Lajoie’s former team filed for an injunction.127  
The team argued that the reserve clause in Lajoie’s contract 
prevented him from playing for another team and that the 
contract did not lack mutuality because Lajoie’s services 
were sufficiently unique to place him in the category of “im-
possible to replace.”128  Lajoie countered with the arguments 
articulated in Ewing and Ward, contending both that the re-
serve clause was invalid and that his contract failed for a 
lack of mutuality of obligation.129 
 
119. See Devine, supra note 20, at 27 n.111-12; BERRY, supra note 20, at 25.  
Ewing and Ward are both members of the Baseball Hall of Fame.  Id. 
120. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 25. 
121. See Dodge, supra note 20, at 40; BERRY, supra note 20, at 25-26. 
122. The American Association, formed in 1881, was another short lived ri-
val league.  Devine, supra note 20, at 14.  It collapsed in 1891.  Id. at 27 n.113. 
123. Id. at 29-41; Dodge, supra note 20, at 40; BERRY, supra note 20, at 26. 
124. 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1902). 
125. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 27. 
126. Lajoie, 202 Pa. at 215, 51 A. at 973.  Lajoie was signed away from the Na-
tional League’s Philadelphia Phillies by the American League’s Philadelphia A’s.  
See Devine, supra note 20, at 34. 
127. Lajoie, 202 Pa. at 215, 51 A. at 973. 
128. Lajoie, 202 Pa. at 213-14. 
129. Id. at 214-15. 
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The trial court denied the team’s request for an injunc-
tion.130  The court reasoned that the prerequisite for an in-
junction was that the player’s services were unique, extraor-
dinary, and of such a character as to render him “impossible 
to replace,” so that his breach of contract would cause his 
employer irreparable harm.131  On appeal, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court reversed this decision.132  The court rejected 
the “impossible to replace” standard as extreme and instead 
articulated a lower standard to obtain an injunction.133  The 
court held that it would enjoin personal service contracts 
which required an employee’s special knowledge, skill, and 
ability, which could not be easily obtained from others in the 
event of default.134  Consequently, the Lajoie court enjoined 
the player from working for any other club within the 
court’s jurisdiction during the term of his contract.135 
The fact that the Lajoie court’s jurisdiction was limited to 
Pennsylvania translated, in reality, to a negligible effect on 
the player’s career.136  The injunction did not force Lajoie to 
return to his National League team—it only prevented him 
from playing games for another team within that state.137  As 
 
130. Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 10 Pa. D. 309 (1901). 
131. Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 216, 51 A. 973, 973 
(Pa. Sup. Ct. 1902).  The trial court concluded that the defendant’s services did 
not measure up to this standard.  Id.  This doctrine originated in the theater in-
dustry.  BERRY, supra note 20, at 24.  Cases centered on the right of a theatrical 
employer to prevent an entertainer from taking a more lucrative engagement.  
Id.; see, e.g., Lumbley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852) (enjoining opera singer 
from abandoning one troupe to join another). 
132. Lajoie, 202 Pa. at 222, 51 A. at 976. 
133. Id. at 216, 51 A. at 973. 
134. Id. at 216, 51 A. at 973.  The court articulated its standard: 
[T]he services of the defendant are of such a unique character, and dis-
play such a special knowledge, skill and ability as renders them of peculiar 
value to the plaintiff, and so difficult of substitution, that their loss will 
produce irreparable injury, in the legal significance of that term, to the 
plaintiff. 
Id. at 217, 51 A. at 974 (emphasis added). 
135. Id. at 222, 51 A. at 976. 
136. See Devine, supra note 20, at 37. 
137. Id. 
    
1996] BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 313 
a result, Lajoie simply did not accompany his new American 
League team to games played in Pennsylvania.138 
Notwithstanding the National League’s narrow victory 
in Lajoie, the decision represented a major success for the 
league on a broader level; subsequent courts adopted the ra-
tionale that professional athletes possessed sufficiently 
unique talents to fit within the category of impossible to re-
place.139  This precedent, which has withstood the test of 
time, effectively holds professional athletes to contracts that 
might be unenforceable in other industries.140 
Thus, as Ward, Ewing, and Lajoie demonstrate, the net ef-
fect of the contracts phase of litigation, despite the limited 
player victories, eventually swayed in the owners’ favor.141  
After Lajoie, injunctions became increasingly available to 
owners, thereby erecting a significant roadblock to players 
and competing leagues.142  As one commentator argues, 
“[f]or those who wished to loosen the established leagues’ 
hold on professional sports, it was obvious that new legal 
strategies had to be devised.  When it came to the one-on-
one contract, the players were overmatched and under-
sized.”143 
B.  Antitrust Phase 
The contracts phase of legal development in professional 
baseball survived until 1914, when the formation of the Fed-
eral League of Professional Base Ball Clubs (“Federal 
League”) brought on another flood of litigation.144  This sec-
tion explains this second wave of litigation, during which 
courts applied antitrust principles to professional sports for 
 
138. Id.  After the injunction was issued, Lajoie was traded to the American 
League’s Cleveland Broncos, where he played in every city but Philadelphia.  Id. 
139. BERRY, supra note 20, at 26. 




144. See Devine, supra note 20, at 42-44. 
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the first time.145  First, this section provides background con-
cerning the general principles underlying antitrust law and 
its corresponding implications on professional sports.  Sec-
ond, this section examines the history of employment rela-
tions in baseball during the antitrust phase. 
1.  The Sherman Act 
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890146 
(“Sherman Act”) in order to temper the spread of industrial 
monopolies that many believed would consume the nation’s 
economy.147  The Sherman Act’s sponsors believed that the 
most effective way to regulate economic activity was to pre-
serve free and unfettered competition.148  The Sherman Act 
did not outlaw every type of agreement or restraint on com-
petition—only those which unreasonably restrain trade and 
competition.149 
The application of antitrust principles to professional 
sports raises a deceptively simple question—who should the 
 
145. See discussion infra part I.B.2 (discussing the application of the antitrust 
principles to professional baseball). 
146. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)).  Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids 
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that are in restraint of trade.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1.  Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization, attempts to mo-
nopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize.  15 U.S.C. § 2. 
147. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945); 
BERRY, supra note 20, at 27.  During the nineteenth century, monopoly power 
emerged as a legitimate threat to economic order.  KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC 
MIRROR 206 (1989).  Fierce competition among maturing industries created 
pinched profit margins that prompted corporate managers to consolidate control 
over greater portions of the market.  To do so, they turned to new legal devices—
first the trust and, in the 1890s, the holding company—that permitted a single 
company to control the pricing and market structure of several “foreign” corpo-
rations.  The new national corporate structure of the economy depended heavily 
for its growth on law and legal institutions.  Id. 
148. See Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958); 
see also Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 247 (1951); WARREN FREEDMAN, 
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND ANTITRUST 4 (1987). 
149. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.  Through its application by the courts, the Sherman 
Act prohibits all price-fixing arrangements or horizontal restraints on trade and 
all other unreasonable restraints on trade.  See id. 
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Sherman Act protect:  players, owners, or neither?150  The 
quandaries raised by this question are abundant, and in-
clude:  (1) whether the administration of antitrust laws that 
protect athletes lessens competition among teams;151 (2) 
whether the administration of antitrust laws that protect 
teams and leagues necessarily hinders competition among 
players for positions on teams paying the highest salaries;152 
(3) whether administration of antitrust laws that promote 
free competition for player resources causes the quality of 
competition within the leagues to drop;153 and (4) whether 
administration of antitrust laws that protect the interests of a 
particular team or league against newcomers gives the pro-
tected team or league a monopoly of the sport.154  Courts de-
ciding sports labor disputes during the antitrust phase were 
forced to confront all of these difficult questions which, by 
their very complicated nature, have led to an inconsistent 
application of antitrust law to professional sports.155 
2. The Antitrust Phase of Baseball Employment 
Relations 
This subsection examines the origination and develop-
ment of baseball’s antitrust exemption.  First, this subsection 
analyzes the New York Supreme Court’s decision in Ameri-
can League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase,156 which first es-
poused the reasoning underlying baseball’s antitrust exemp-
tion.  Second, this subsection discusses the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore 
 
150. See also Ross, supra note 20; Dodge, supra note 20; JENNINGS, supra note 
81; cf. Allyn Young, The Sherman Act and the New Anti-trust Legislation, in  A 
CENTURY OF THE SHERMAN ACT:  AMERICAN ECONOMIC OPINION, 1890-1990 19 
(1992) (discussing the policy rationales underlying the Sherman Act). 




155. See discussion infra part I.B.2 (discussing the application of antitrust 
principles to professional baseball); infra part II.A (discussing the application of 
antitrust principles to professional football). 
156. 86 Misc. 441 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914). 
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v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,157 which 
adopted the reasoning of Chase to exempt baseball from anti-
trust rules.  Third, this subsection examines the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decision in Gardella v. Chandler,158 
which held that baseball was interstate commerce under the 
Sherman Act, and the Supreme Court’s rejection of Gardella 
in Toolson v. New York Yankees.159  Finally, this subsection 
analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in Flood v. Kuhn,160 
which rejected the Court’s definition of interstate commerce 
formulated in Federal Baseball. 
 a. The Genesis of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption 
 In 1914, the formation of the Federal League triggered 
another exodus of National League players, and with it, a 
renewed wave of sports litigation.161  The first case in the an-
titrust phase arose when Hal Chase, a well-known first 
baseman, signed with the Federal League’s Buffalo fran-
chise, despite being under contract to play for the American 
League’s Chicago team.162  The Chicago club successfully 
obtained a preliminary injunction, which Chase sought to 
vacate in Chase.163  In Chase, the New York State Supreme 
Court once again examined the mutuality of the ten-day 
termination and the reserve option clauses.164  The court held 
that the contract evinced an “absolute lack of mutuality,” 
and therefore was not enforceable.165 
In addition to the issue of mutuality, the Chase court ex-
amined the state and federal antitrust implications of league 
 
157. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
158. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949). 
159. 346 U.S. 356, reh’g granted, 346 U.S. 917 (1953). 
160. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
161. See McCormick, supra note 20, at 1146-47; Devine, supra note 20, at 41-
45; BERRY, supra note 20, at 28. 
162. See Devine, supra note 20, at 44; BERRY, supra note 20, at 28. 
163. 86 Misc. 441 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914). 
164. Id. at 445-58.  As explained above in Part I.A, the New York Supreme 
Court previously considered the ten-day termination and reserve clauses in  
Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (S. Ct. 1890).  See supra notes 108-14 (discussing Ward). 
165. Chase, 86 Misc. at 455-56. 
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operations.166  The court decided that “organized baseball” 
was as complete a monopoly “as a[ny] monopoly can be cre-
ated among free men . . . .”167  The court reasoned not only 
that organized baseball was an illegal combination under the 
Sherman Act,168 but also that it violated, as property rights, 
both the right to labor169 and the right to contract.170  None-
theless, the Chase court, relying on the United States Su-
preme Court’s definition of interstate commerce,171 con-
cluded that there was no violation of the Sherman Act.172  
The court reasoned that baseball was not interstate com-
merce because it was not a commodity or an article of mer-
 
166. Id. at 458-67.  In his motion to vacate the injunction, Chase raised the 
question of whether the rules and regulations adopted pursuant to the league’s 
national agreement violated the Sherman Act.  Id. at 441-42, 458-59. 
167. Id. at 459.  The court stated: 
It is apparent from the analysis already set forth of the agreement and 
rules forming the combination of the baseball business, referred to as 
‘organized baseball,’ that a monopoly of baseball as a business has been 
ingeniously devised and created in so far as a monopoly can be created 
among free men . . . . 
Id. 
  168   Id. at 461. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).  In E.C. Knight, the 
Court limited the regulation of commerce to “the subjects of commerce, and not 
to matters of internal police.”  Id. at 13.  The Court defined the subjects of com-
merce to include contracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods transported among the 
states, and the instrumentalities of their transportation.  Id.  The Court held:  
“Contracts to buy, sell or exchange goods transported among the several States, 
the transportation and its instrumentalities, and articles bought, sold or ex-
changed for the purposes of such transit among the States, or put in the way of 
transit, may be regulated.”  Id.  The E.C. Knight Court added that “the intent of 
the manufacturer does not determine when an article passes from the control of 
the state and belongs to commerce.”  Id.  Finally the Court also held: 
The fact that an article is manufactured for export to another state does 
not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce, and the intent of 
the manufacturer does not determine the time when the article or prod-
uct passes from the control of the state and belongs to commerce. 
Id. 
172. Chase, 86 Misc. at 459.  The court stated:  “I cannot agree to the proposi-
tion that the business of baseball for profit is interstate trade or commerce, and 
therefore subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act.”  Id. 
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chandise.173 
 b. Federal Approval of Baseball’s Antitrust 
Exemption 
Notwithstanding its victory in Chase, the Federal League 
did not last much longer than the Brotherhood League.174  
Out of the Federal League’s ashes, one owner brought suit 
against each of the sixteen teams in the National and Ameri-
can Leagues, the National Commission,175 and three former 
Federal League owners.176  The complaint alleged a conspir-
acy by the defendants, in violation of the Sherman Act, to 
damage the owner’s attempts to operate a baseball team.177  
The plaintiff-owner was successful at the trial level, and won 
a verdict for $80,000, which was trebled under the provisions 
of the Sherman Act.178  On appeal, the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the 
defendants’ activities were not within the scope of the Sher-
 
173. Id. at 460.  The court held:  “Baseball is an amusement, a sport, a game 
that comes clearly within the civil and criminal law of the state, and it is not a 
commodity or an article of merchandise subject to the regulation of congress on 
the theory that it is interstate commerce.”  Id.  The court rejected the argument 
that baseball players, by virtue of being bought and sold and dealt in among the 
several states, are thus reduced and commercialized into commodities.  Id. at 459.  
The court held: 
A commodity is defined as “that which is useful; anything that is useful 
or serviceable; particularly an article of merchandise; anything movable 
that is a subject of trade or of acquisition.”  We are not dealing with the 
bodies of the players as commodities or articles of merchandise, but 
with their services as retained or transferred by contract. 
Id. at 459-60. 
174. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 50.  The Federal League struggled through 
two seasons, 1914 and 1915, before it collapsed amid allegations that the estab-
lished leagues engaged in activities that went beyond holding players to alleg-
edly improper contracts.  See Ross, supra note 20, at 692. 
175. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball 
Club of Baltimore, 269 F. 681, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1920), aff’d, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).  The 
National Commission is an administrative body composed of the presidents of 
the two leagues and a third person, selected by them.  Id. 
176. Id. at 681-82. 
177. Id. 
178. See id. at 682.  The lower court awarded treble damages pursuant to sec-
tion 7 of the Sherman Act. 
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Sherman Act.179 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the Sherman 
Act’s applicability to baseball in Federal Baseball.180  Justice 
Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, employed the same 
reasoning as the Chase court—that baseball, although a busi-
ness, did not involve interstate commerce because the sport 
was strictly a state matter.181  In addition, Justice Holmes 
concluded that baseball was not “trade or commerce” for the 
purposes of the Sherman Act.182  Therefore, the Sherman Act 
did not apply to the National League’s restrictive prac-
tices.183  One commentator has explained that the Court’s 
decision in Federal Baseball “removed all legal obstacles to the 
continued maintenance of the reserve system and sustained 
the system against all challenges for an additional fifty 
years.”184 
c. Subsequent Challenges and Reaffirmances of 
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption 
One of the first challenges to Federal Baseball was the 1949 
case, Gardella v. Chandler.185  In Gardella, the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit held that the advent of television and 
radio broadcasting of baseball games had sufficiently 
changed the nature of the sport so as to bring it under the 
 
179. Federal Baseball, 269 F. at 687-88. 
180. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
181. Id. at 208-09.  Justice Holmes wrote: 
The business is giving exhibitions of base ball [sic], which are purely 
state affairs. . . . [T]he fact that in order to give the exhibitions the 
Leagues must induce free persons to cross state lines and must arrange 
and pay for their doing so is not enough to change the character of the 
business. . . . [T]he transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing.  
That to which it is incident, the exhibition, although made for money 
would not be called trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use 
of those words.  As it is put by the defendants, personal effort, not re-
lated to production, is not a subject of commerce. 
Id. 
182. Id. at 209. 
183. Id. at 208-09. 
184. McCormick, supra note 20, at 1146-47. 
185. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949). 
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Sherman Act.186  Judge Frank concurred in Gardella, and rec-
ognized that the Supreme Court had considerably broad-
ened the definition of “interstate” activities and “trade or 
commerce” for purposes of the Sherman Act during the in-
tervening years since Federal Baseball.187  Nevertheless, the 
parties in Gardella settled the case before they could appeal 
the Second Circuit’s opinion to the Supreme Court.188 
The validity of baseball’s exemption from antitrust re-
mained unresolved until the Supreme Court revisited it in 
Toolson v. New York Yankees.189  In Toolson, the Court ignored 
the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Gardella, and reaffirmed its 
holding in Federal Baseball that baseball did not fall within 
the scope of the Sherman Act.190  The Court held that Federal 
Baseball still controlled, reasoning that Congress, rather than 
the courts, should remedy any antitrust concerns arising in 
professional baseball.191 
 
186. Id. at 407-08. 
187. Id. at 412 (Frank, J., concurring).  Judge Frank wrote: 
In the Federal Baseball case, the Court assigned as a further ground of 
its decision that the playing of the games, although for profit, involved 
services, and that services were not “trade or commerce” as those words 
were used in the Sherman Act.  But I think that such a restricted inter-
pretation of those words has been undeniably repudiated in later Su-
preme Court decisions concerning medical services and motion pic-
tures.  I believe, therefore, that we will not trespass on the Supreme 
Court’s domain if we hold that the rationale of the Federal Baseball case 
is now confined to the insufficiency of traveling, when employed as a 
means of accomplishing local activities, to establish the existence of in-
terstate commerce. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  See American Med. Ass’n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 
(1943); Binderup v. Pathe Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923); Paramount Famous 
Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930); United States v. First Nat’l Pic-
tures 282 U.S. 44 (1930); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 
(1939); North Am. Co. v. SEC  327 U.S. 686 (1946). 
188. McCormick, supra note 20, at 1148.  Professor McCormick contends that 
after Gardella, Justice Holmes’ conclusion in Federal Baseball, that the Sherman Act 
did not apply to professional baseball, was untenable.  Id. 
189. 346 U.S. 356, reh’g granted, 346 U.S. 917 (1953). 
190. Id. at 357. 
191. Id. at 357.  The court explained: 
Congress has had the ruling under consideration but has not seen fit to 
bring such business under these laws by legislation having prospective 
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In 1972, the Supreme Court examined and affirmed base-
ball’s antitrust exemption for a third time in Flood v. Kuhn.192  
Although the Court ultimately bowed to precedent, it did 
concede that the narrow definition of interstate commerce 
employed in Federal Baseball was no longer valid,193 and  that 
baseball, as an industry, was “engaged in interstate com-
merce.”194  Acknowledging that other professional sports fell 
under the Sherman Act, the Court maintained that baseball, 
“[w]ith its reserve system enjoying exception from the fed-
eral antitrust law . . . is, in a very distinct sense, an exception 
and an anomaly.”195  The Court explained the incongruity 
between its current expanded definition of interstate com-
merce and baseball’s exemption as an aberration, “fully enti-
tled to the benefit of stare decisis,” which rested on the recog-
nition and acceptance of the sport’s unique characteristics 
                                                                                                                                  
effect.  The business has thus been left for thirty years to develop, on the 
understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation.  
The present cases ask us to overrule the prior decision and, with retro-
spective effect, hold the legislation applicable.  We think that if there are 
evils in this field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust 
laws it should be by legislation.  Without re-examination of the underly-
ing issues, the judgments below are affirmed on the authority of Federal 
Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs 
. . . . 
Id. 
192. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
193. Id. at 282-83.  The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to regu-
late trade “among the several States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ch.3.  In early cases, 
this provision was interpreted to exempt intrastate activity from congressional 
regulation unless it had a direct effect on interstate commerce.  Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  The Supreme Court departed from 
this strict standard in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), where it applied a more lenient and practical necessary 
effect test in upholding the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act.  
Subsequent cases further expanded Congress’s regulatory power to include all 
activities having a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  See United States v. 
Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) (holding that pharmaceutical drugs shipped inter-
state fall under federal regulations); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) 
(holding that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 applies to employees for the 
production of goods for interstate commerce) (citation omitted). 
194. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. 
195. Id. 
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and needs.196  Along this line, the Court again stated that it 
would adhere to legal precedent, leaving any inconsistency 
to be remedied by Congress, not the Court.197 
After Flood, the antitrust exemption ceased to play an ac-
tive role in defining employment relations between owners 
and players.198  It became clear to baseball players that they 
needed to find a new approach to their legal challenges of 
the owners.199  Although contract principles had provided 
limited assistance, that help quickly faded after Lajoie.200  An-
 
196. Id.  The court explained: 
It is an aberration that has been with us now for half a century, one 
heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and one 
that has survived to the Court’s expanding concept of interstate com-
merce.  It rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s unique 
characteristics and needs. 
Id. 
197. Id. at 284. 
198. Baseball’s antitrust exemption has not been invoked or challenged in 
the area of employment relations between owners and players since Flood.  The 
exemption, however, has been invoked, challenged, and limited in the context of 
a number of other areas.  See, e.g., Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 530, 532, 540-41 
(7th Cir. 1978) (examining the exemption in the context of a baseball club 
owner’s claim that the Commissioner of Baseball, by disapproving the club’s 
agreement to sell its contract rights for player services, conspired to eliminate the 
club from baseball in violation of federal antitrust laws); Henderson Broadcast-
ing, Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 264 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (invok-
ing exemption to challenge a claim by a radio station involving a contract dis-
pute over broadcast rights); Postema v. National League of Professional Baseball 
Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1477 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (invoking the exemption to bar 
state antitrust claims in discrimination suit by female umpire), rev’d, 998 F.2d 60 
(2nd Cir. 1993); Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 421 (E.D. Pa. 
1993) (invoking exemption in response to claim that Major League Baseball frus-
trated the plaintiff’s efforts to purchase the San Francisco Giants and relocate it 
to Tampa Bay, Florida); McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454, 455-
56 (W.D. Wash 1995) (invoking exemption in response to class action suit by fans 
of baseball and businesses that operate within the vicinity of baseball stadiums 
claiming that the league’s actions in the 1994 strike violated antitrust laws); But-
terworth v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021, 1021 
(Fla. 1994) (examining applicability of exemption to cases involving the sale and 
location of baseball franchises); Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 663 So. 2d 
653, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (invoking exemption in claim alleging tortious 
interference with attempt to purchase a baseball franchise), review denied, 673 So. 
2d 29 (Fla. 1996). 
199. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 31; McCormick, supra note 20, at 1150. 
200. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 30. 
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titrust actions were almost entirely unsuccessful because of 
the Supreme Court’s reluctance to overturn a fifty year-old 
interpretation of the Sherman Act.201  Thus, the baseball 
players’ first two waves of legal challenges had failed; but 
from this impasse was born the third wave of legal chal-
lenge—labor law.202 
C. Labor Phase 
The limited victories that baseball players gained in the 
contracts and antitrust phases prompted a new approach to 
player-owner relations in baseball.203  This section examines 
the labor law phase, which, along with collective bargaining, 
had become central by the mid-1970s in shaping the future 
of employment relations in professional sports.204  First, this 
section reviews some of the underlying principles of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act and the National Labor Relations 
Board, and their respective implications on professional 
sports employment relations during the labor phase.  Sec-
ond, this section examines the development of employment 
relations in professional baseball during the labor phase.  
During this phase, player victories in arbitration hearings, 
the courts, and collective bargaining negotiations brought 
professional baseball employment relations completely un-
der the jurisdiction of labor law. 
1. The National Labor Relations Act and the 
National Labor Relations Board 
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)205 and the 
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) play a fundamen-
tal role in the still current labor phase of employment rela-
 
201. See Flood, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson, 346 U.S. 356, reh’g granted, 346 
U.S. 917 (1953); Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Gardella, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 
1949). 
202. BERRY, supra note 20, at 30. 
203. Id. at 31. 
204. Id. 
205. The National Labor Relations Act was first enacted as the Wagner Act, 
ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1994)). 
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tions in professional baseball.  First, this subsection provides 
background concerning the general principles of the NLRA.  
Second, this subsection briefly examines how the NLRB ad-
ministers the NLRA’s principles.  Finally, this subsection ex-
plains how professional sports came under the jurisdiction 
of the NLRA. 
a. The National Labor Relations Act 
The NLRA and the NLRB play a large role in defining the 
labor phase of professional sports employment relations.206  
The NLRA covers workers involved in interstate commerce, 
including professional team sports.207  Section 7 of the NLRA 
provides for three basic rights of U.S. labor relations policy:  
(1) the right to self-organization; (2) the right to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of the employees’ own 
choosing; and (3) the right to engage in “concerted activities” 
for employees’ mutual aid or protection.208  In short, the 
NLRA protects workers’ rights to unionize, bargain collec-
tively, and use pressure tactics, including strikes and pickets, 
to achieve legitimate objectives.209 
b. The National Labor Relations Board 
The NLRB carries out the administration of the NLRA’s 
principles.210  The NLRA established the NLRB to protect 
workers from unfair employer labor practices, to oversee 
elections for union representatives, and to enforce collective 
bargaining agreements (“CBA”).211  In addition, the NLRA 
gives the NLRB punitive powers to enforce its findings.212  
The NLRB enforces the law by policing unfair labor practices 
 
206. See id. 
207. Id. § 152. 
208. Id. § 157. 
209. Id.; see BERRY, supra note 20, at 32. 
210. 29 U.S.C. § 151; see NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 
(1953) (holding that the business of the NLRB is to give coordinated effect to the 
policies of the federal labor relations acts); HALL, supra note 147, at 275. 
211. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 159-160; see Hall, supra note 147, at 275. 
212. 29 U.S.C. §§ 160, 162. 
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committed either by management or labor.213  The NLRB 
also reviews questions concerning whether issues are subject 
to collective bargaining under the law.214  The majority of the 
NLRB’s work in sports involves resolving unfair labor prac-
tices and defining the scope of bargaining.215 
The two most common allegations of unfair labor prac-
tices in sports are that the employer has disciplined or dis-
charged players for engaging in union activities, and that the 
employer has refused to bargain in good faith.216  The prin-
ciples of good faith bargaining require that the parties com-
municate through proposals and counter-proposals, and that 
they make every reasonable effort to come to an agree-
ment.217 
The NLRB has divided the subjects of collective bargain-
ing into three groups:  mandatory, permissive, and illegal.218  
Mandatory subjects include wages, hours, and working con-
ditions, all of which must be negotiated in good faith.219  
Permissive bargaining subjects include those that manage-
ment may, but is not obligated, to negotiate.220  Illegal sub-
jects of bargaining are those prohibited from being negoti-
ated.221  The NLRB is often called upon to determine 
whether an issue, such as wage scales or the use of artificial 
turf, is subject to collective bargaining negotiation.222 
c. Professional Sports Come Under the 
 
213. 29 U.S.C. § 158. 
214. 29 U.S.C. § 151.  This process is generally referred to as defining the 
scope of bargaining.  See PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, THE SPORTS INDUSTRY AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 11 (2d ed. 1989). 
215. See STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 11. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. See id. 
219. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 158; see STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 11. 
220. STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 11-12.  Permissive subjects are manage-
ment rights or prerogatives that the employer has an exclusive right to deter-
mine.  Id. 
221. Id. at 12. 
222. Id. 
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Jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations 
Act 
To benefit from the NLRA’s protection, a labor group 
must convince the NLRB that it is entitled to coverage under 
the NLRA.223  It was not clear whether the NLRB had juris-
diction in the sports industry until 1969, when baseball um-
pires sought NLRB recognition (the “umpires’ case”).224  De-
spite the Supreme Court’s Federal Baseball holding, the NLRB 
concluded that professional baseball was an industry affect-
ing interstate commerce, and thus was within the NLRB’s ju-
risdiction.225  In addition, the Court’s subsequent decision in 
Flood buttressed the NLRB’s decision, despite its holding 
which affirmed baseball’s antitrust immunity.226  Although 
the Flood Court expressed fidelity to the principles of stare 
decisis, it specifically stated that baseball was engaged in in-
terstate commerce.227  The Court thus subjected the league to 
the NLRA’s protections and requirements as established in 
the umpires’ case.228 
2. Baseball in the Labor Phase 
The 1969 victory for major league umpires coincided 
with the first CBAs forged between players’ unions and the 
various leagues.229  The NLRB’s decision to bring baseball 
within its jurisdiction opened an avenue of advancement to 
the players that was not obstructed by antitrust baggage.230  
 
223. 29 U.S.C. § 159. 
224. The American League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Association 
of National Baseball League Umpires, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969). 
225. Id. at 192. 
226. See McCormick, supra note 20, at 1152; BERRY, supra note 20, at 33. 
227. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. 
228. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text (discussing the umpires’ 
case). 
229. BERRY, supra note 20, at 33; see infra note 246 and accompanying text 
(discussing baseball’s first CBA). 
230. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 33; cf. McCormick, supra note 20, at 1152 
(explaining that because the umpires’ case subjected professional baseball to the 
provisions of the NLRA, owners were forced to bargain in good faith with play-
ers concerning the terms and conditions of employment). 
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To illustrate the effect of this decision, this subsection exam-
ines the growth of the baseball players’ union and the im-
pact of collective bargaining on the employment relation-
ship. 
In 1954, the Major League Baseball Players Association 
(“MLBPA”) was formed.231  The MLBPA faced many early 
obstacles.232  Principal among them was a bolstering of the 
owners’ institution—an organization challenged by the 
MLBPA⎯by Supreme Court rulings upholding organized 
baseball’s exemption from the Sherman Act.233  The owners’ 
strength was reflected in player contracts, which one com-
mentator described as “unilateral instruments” that read like 
“real estate leases.”234 
Baseball players were slow to use their union as an effec-
tive bargaining tool.235  They resisted the idea that the 
MLBPA was a labor union because they scoffed at the notion 
of being associated with the manual laborers, who at that 
time comprised the majority of labor unions.236  Bob Feller, a 
Hall of Fame pitcher and the first MLBPA president, overtly 
questioned whether collective bargaining could be carried 
into baseball.237  Bob Friend, Feller’s successor as MLBPA 
president, went even further and stated, “I firmly believe a 
 
231. Katz, supra note 20, at 381. 
232. See supra part I.C.2 (discussing baseball players’ early challenges to 
league practices). 
233. See supra part I.B (discussing the evolution and implementation of 
baseball’s antitrust exemption). 
234. BERRY, supra note 20, at 52.  One commentator describes the inequity of 
the player contracts as follows: 
On signing a contract, a player swore to abide by the rules set down by 
management and to conform to any changes in management’s rules, 
without even receiving a copy of these rules.  The contract entitled team 
owners to administer discipline and required players’ grievances to be 
appealed to the commissioner of baseball, and employee of the owners. 
Id. 
235. See McCormick, supra note 20, at 1150-51; BERRY, supra note 20, at 52. 
236. See McCormick, supra note 20, at 1150-51; BERRY, supra note 20, at 52. 
237. American League Changes Rule on Play-Off of Tie for Pennant, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 11, 1956, at 52. 
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union, in the fullest sense of the word, simply would not fit 
the situation in baseball.”238 
In 1966, it was clear to the players that they possessed no 
effective negotiating power with the owners.239  To remedy 
this situation, they hired Marvin Miller as executive director 
of the MLBPA.240  Miller had served as chief economist and 
bargainer for the United States Steelworkers of America for 
sixteen years, and had been a member of several presidential 
labor/management boards.241  As a result, Miller was well 
respected by union, management, and government lead-
ers.242  The players believed their interests to be in capable 
hands.243 
The MLBPA won great gains for its members with Miller 
as its executive director.244  In the first eight years of Miller’s 
tenure (1966-74), players’ pensions more than tripled, the 
minimum salary rose from $6,000 to $16,000, and the aver-
age salary more than doubled to $40,956.245  The key year for 
players during this period was 1968, when they came to 
terms with the owners and negotiated baseball’s first 
CBA.246  As one commentator has pointed out, “[t]he stage 
was set for a new assault by the players, not through the 
lengthy and largely unsuccessful route of litigation, but 
through negotiation, some intimidation, and, above all, arbi-
tration.”247 
In 1970 and 1973, the MLBPA negotiated arbitration pro-
 
238. Brady, Player Rep Friend Raps Proposal That Athletes Form Labor Union, 
SPORTING NEWS, Aug. 3, 1963, at 4. 
239. BERRY, supra note 20, at 53. 
240. McCormick, supra note 20, at 1152. 
241. Id.; BERRY, supra note 20, at 53. 
242. McCormick, supra note 20, at 1152. 
243. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 53. 
244. See infra note 245 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits won 
for players during Marvin Miller’s first eight years as executive director of the 
MLBPA); McCormick, supra note 20, at 1152; BERRY, supra note 20, at 53. 
245. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 53. 
246. Chalian, supra note 20, at 606; BERRY, supra note 20, at 53. 
247. BERRY, supra note 20, at 53. 
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visions into the CBAs.248  In the 1970 agreement, the MLBPA 
negotiated a provision creating a tripartite grievance arbitra-
tion panel with a permanent impartial chairman.249  In the 
1973 agreement, the MLBPA negotiated a clause providing 
for neutral arbitrators to determine players’ salaries, in the 
event that the player and team were unable to come to 
terms.250  Therefore, in 1974, when a dispute between Oak-
land A’s pitcher Jim “Catfish” Hunter and Oakland’s owner 
Charles O. Finley reached an impasse, the matter was 
brought to arbitration.251 
Hunter had previously made an agreement with Finley 
that half of his 1974 salary was to be set aside in an insurance 
trust.252  When the season ended, Finley, despite numerous 
requests, had failed to make the required payments.253  
Hunter maintained that Finley’s refusal to pay was a breach 
of contract enabling Hunter to exert his right to terminate 
the contract,254 and subsequently announced that he was a 
free agent.255 Finley insisted that there was no free agent 
question, but only a question of contract interpretation con-
cerning the method of payment.256  The matter was then 
submitted to an arbitrator, Peter Seitz, pursuant to the griev-
ance arbitration provision of the 1973 CBA.257 
Seitz found no ambiguity in the contract and ruled in 
Hunter’s favor.258  As a result, Hunter became a free agent 
 
248. STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 25. 
249. Id.  This replaced a system under which disputes over the interpreta-
tion of the CBA were finally ruled on by the commissioner of baseball, an em-
ployee of the owners.  Id. 
250. Id. 
251. Devine, supra note 20, at 81-82. 
252. BERRY, supra note 20, at 54. 
253. Devine, supra note 20, at 82. 
254. BERRY, supra note 20, at 54. 
255. Id.; see Devine, supra note 20, at 82. 
256. BERRY, supra note 20, at 54. 
257. Devine, supra note 20, at 81-82; BERRY, supra note 20, at 54. 
258. BERRY, supra note 20, at 81 n.33 (citing In the Matter of arbitration be-
tween American and National Leagues of Professional Baseball Clubs (Oakland 
Athletics) and Major League Baseball Players Association (James A. Hunter), De-
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and was allowed to consider offers from any team.259  By the 
end of the year, Hunter had accepted an offer from the New 
York Yankees for an “unprecedented” salary, including a $1 
million signing bonus, a $150,000 annual salary for five 
years, life insurance benefits worth $1 million, and a sub-
stantial amount of deferred compensation.260 
In 1975, the baseball players again resorted to the arbitra-
tion system to attenuate the owners’ control over player mo-
bility.261  This time, the target of their collective assault was 
the restrictive reserve rule,262 which contained a renewal 
year provision that gave owners the option to renew a 
player’s contract under the terms of the previous contract, in 
the event that the player and owner failed to reach an 
agreement on a new contract.263  The first arbitration chal-
lenge to the reserve rule occurred in 1975, when pitchers 
Andy Messersmith of the Los Angeles Dodgers and Dave 
McNally of the Montreal Expos played for their respective 
clubs for one year under the renewal provision of their con-
tracts.264  Upon conclusion of the baseball season, both play-
ers contended that their employment status could not be ex-
tended per the reserve rule, and declared themselves free 
agents.265  When their requests for free agency status were 
denied, Messersmith and McNally filed grievances with the 
league and forced the owners to arbitration.266 
                                                                                                                                  
cision No. 23, Grievance Nos. 74-18 and 74-20, Dec. 13, 1974. Seitz, Impartial 
Chair of Panel). 
259. BERRY, supra note 20, at 54. 
260. Id. 
261. See id. at 56. 
262. Id.; see supra note 47 (discussing baseball’s reserve rule). 
263. McCormick, supra note 20, at 1155.  The Uniform Player’s Contract pro-
vided:  “If [prior to the beginning of the season] the Player and the Club have not 
agreed upon the terms of [a] contract, . . . the Club shall have the right . . . to re-
new this contract for the period of one year on the same terms. . . .”  Uniform 
Player’s Contract, clause 10(a), reprinted in Flood, 407 U.S. at 259-61 n.1. 
264. Katz, supra note 20, at 382 n.58. 
265. BERRY, supra note 20, at 56. 
266. Professional Baseball Clubs, 66 L.A. 101 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.).  Because 
Messersmith and McNally submitted their grievances on the same grounds, the 
grievances were heard together.  Id. at 101-02. 
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The owners contested the merits of the grievances, argu-
ing that the contracts had not expired because, under the re-
serve clause, the contracts created annual options to renew 
themselves under the terms of the latest contracts, provided 
that the club duly reserved the player.267  Therefore, under 
the owners’ interpretation of the reserve clause, as long as 
the club reserved its players each year, new options to retain 
reserved players would be created perpetually.268  Alterna-
tively, the owners argued that the players’ grievances were 
not a proper subject for arbitration because Article 15 of the 
1973 CBA,269 which the players used as the basis for their 
complaints, expressly stipulated that the agreement did “not 
deal with the reserve system.”270  Consequently, in the own-
ers’ opinion, Article 15 prohibited arbitration of issues that 
focused on the reserve system’s core.271  Peter Seitz once 
again headed the arbitration and agreed with the players, 
concluding both that he had the authority to hear the matter 
and that Messersmith and McNally were free agents.272 
The owners promptly appealed Seitz’s decision to federal 
court, contending that Seitz had exceeded his authority as 
arbitrator by nullifying the reserve system.273  Nonetheless, 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Seitz’s decision 
in Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball 
Players’ Ass’n.274  The court, through an examination of the 
1968, 1970, and 1973 baseball CBAs, concluded that the own-
ers had, in fact, permitted the arbitration of grievances relat-
ing to the reserve system, and that, as a result, Seitz did have 
 
267. Id. at 102. 
268. Id. at 113. 
269. Basic Agreement between the American League of Professional Base-
ball Clubs and the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Major 
League Baseball Players Association, art. 15. (1973). 
270. Professional Baseball Clubs, 66 L.A. at 101-02. 
271. Id. at 103. 
272. Id. at 110, 117. 
273. STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 35. 
274. 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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jurisdiction to resolve the issue.275  This ruling left the own-
ers with little choice but to negotiate vigorously with the 
MLBPA in the upcoming 1976 collective bargaining concern-
ing changes in the administration of the reserve system.276 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Kansas City Royals forced 
owners and players to focus on free agency and the reserve 
rule during the 1976 collective bargaining negotiations.277  In 
general, the players were content with the status quo estab-
lished by the Messersmith and McNally arbitration:  free 
agency after playing for one year under the renewal provi-
sion of the reserve rule.278  Although the owners recognized 
that the old reserve system was lost, they refused to grant 
unfettered free agency to the players as provided by Seitz’s 
arbitration decision.279  For the most part, the owners were 
motivated by the fear that a player-friendly free agency sys-
tem would result in unrestrained player movement, dra-
matic salary increases, and a shift in competitive balance fa-
voring the teams with the most money.280  As a result, the 
owners attempted to win back some of what they had lost in 
arbitration by assuming a hard line position in the negotia-
tions.281 
The owners’ hard stance, and the players’ new-found 
strength, led the negotiations to an impasse; in March of 
 
275. Id. at 629-32.  The owners had expressly authorized the arbitration of 
grievances relating to the reserve system in the 1968 CBA.  Id. at 629.  The court 
suggested that the reason the team owners had agreed to arbitrate such griev-
ances was because the 1968 CBA designated the Commissioner of Baseball as the 
arbitrator, and that he, recognizing the importance of the reserve system to base-
ball, would interpret the disputed provisions to allow teams perpetual control  
over their 
 players.  Id. 
276. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 57; STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 35. 
277. See Smith, supra note 76, at 124; JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 35-36. 
278. BERRY, supra note 20, at 57-58; see JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 35-36; see 
also STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 35. 
279. See JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 35-39; STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 35; 
BERRY, supra note 20, at 60-62. 
280. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 61; JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 37. 
281. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 61; JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 35-37. 
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1976, the owners shut down training camps—a lockout 
which lasted seventeen days.282  The resulting CBA bound 
players to their respective teams for six years, plus a one 
year renewal option.283  In exchange for this concession, the 
players received increases in their pension fund and a raise 
in minimum salary.284  By the end of the 1976 season, 
twenty-four of the 600 players in the major leagues had be-
come free agents.285  In 1977, three players each received 
multi-year contracts for more than $2 million.286 
In the end, the 1976 lockout had a negligible effect on the 
baseball season.287  Although the players missed some spring 
training practice, the fans witnessed a full regular-season 
schedule of 162 games.288  Notwithstanding this fact, the 
1976 CBA significantly modified the free agency system.289  
That is, the agreement provided an equitable amount of 
freedom for players and restraint for owners.290  Nonethe-
less, any satisfaction that the owners’ derived from this new 
system quickly disappeared, when player salaries sharply 
rose in the years following the agreement.291 
With these escalating salaries in mind, the owners took 
issue once again with free agency, when the 1976 CBA ex-
pired on January 1, 1980, and negotiations for the new CBA 
 
282. JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 36-37; BERRY, supra note 20, at 61.  A lock-
out—the “employer’s withholding of work from employees in order to gain con-
cession from them”—is the employer’s correlative to the employee’s strike.  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 940 (6th ed. 1990). 
283. BERRY, supra note 20, at 61; JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 39. 
284. BERRY, supra note 20, at 61-62; JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 39. 
285. STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 35. 
286. Id. 
287. BERRY, supra note 20, at 62. 
288. Id. 
289. Id.  Under the new system, players were eligible for free agency after 6 
years.  Id.  In addition, teams losing free agents were compensated with amateur 
draft choices, regardless of the free agent.  See JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 39. 
290. BERRY, supra note 20, at 62; see JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 39. 
291. BERRY, supra note 20, at 62; see JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 41; 
STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 35. 
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began one month later.292  In this latest round of negotia-
tions, the owners sought a system of increased compensation 
for clubs that lost players to free agency.293  Such a system, in 
the owners’ opinion, would deter free agency and help re-
tard the runaway growth of salaries.294  The owners brought 
in Ray Grebey, a man with a reputation for a hard-handed, 
“take it or leave it” style of bargaining, as their chief negotia-
tor,.295 
Through their prized advocate, the owners proposed a 
two-part offer to the players in February 1980.296  Their pro-
posal established both a wage scale, providing minimum 
and maximum salaries for players with fewer than six years 
of service in the major leagues, and a new free agency com-
pensation system, whereby a team that lost a star player to 
free agency would get a good, though not necessarily com-
parable, player in return from the signing team.297  Compen-
sation for a team losing a non-star player to free agency 
would be an additional choice in the amateur draft.298  The 
MLBPA, besides objecting to the wage scale system on prin-
ciple, construed the owners’ compensation plan as a plot to 
limit player mobility.299  The union countered with a pro-
posal that expanded the current system, reducing the quali-
fication for free agency from six to four years.300 
When no agreement was reached by March of 1980, the 
 
292. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 62. 
293. See id. at 62-64; JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 43-44. 
294. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 62; JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 44-45. 
295. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 63; JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 41. 
296. Thomas Boswell, Baseball Owners Set a Sweet Trap, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 
1980, at F1. 
297. Id.  A team would be allowed to protect 15 players on its 40 man major 
league roster.  Id.  The team losing its player to free agency could select a player 
from the unprotected group of 25 players on the signing team’s roster.  Id. 
298. BERRY, supra note 20, at 64. 
299. Thomas Boswell, Baseball Players Authorize a Strike, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 
1980, at D1; Jane Leavy & Peter Mehlman, Witching Hour for Baseball is Just Days 
Away, WASH. POST, May 18, 1980, at F1; see Jane Leavy, A Ray of Hope in Mudville, 
WASH. POST, May 23, 1980, at A1. 
300. JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 43. 
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players authorized a strike.301  The owners attempted to 
head off this strike on March 18 by withdrawing the wage 
scale proposal.302  Although the MLBPA did not accept this 
updated offer, the association did postpone the strike until 
May 22, the eve of the lucrative Memorial Day Weekend.303  
Toward the end of March, having not reached agreement, 
the two sides chose to go to mediation.304  As a result, the 
lack of a CBA did not preclude the season from opening as 
scheduled.305 
On May 16, the MLBPA offered to resolve the impasse by 
accepting the status quo for the present season306 and defer-
ring the compensation issue until later talks.307  This pro-
posal, however, was conditioned on the resolution of several 
other issues, including player pensions and minimum sala-
ries.308  In addition, the players suggested a joint la-
bor/management committee to consider the future of free 
agency.309  Although they initially rejected the players’ pro-
posal, the owners soon relented under the pressure of a 
work stoppage before Memorial Day weekend.310  The strike 
was again averted. 
 
301. Boswell, supra note 299, at D1; JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 45. 
302. Leavy & Mehlman, supra note 299, at F1; Murray Chass, Information 
Bank Abstracts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1980, § 4, at 21; BERRY, supra note 20, at 65. 
303. Dave Kindred, Players Call Off Rest of Exhibition Baseball Games, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 2, 1980, at D1; see Shirley Povich, What Miller Wants is Usually What 
Players Get, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1980, at N1. 
304. Nancy Scannell, Federal Mediators Join Baseball Talks, WASH. POST, Mar. 
28, 1980, at E1. 
305. Play Ball Will Ring Out Again, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1980, at D1; see 
Povich, supra note 303, at N1. 
306. See supra note 289 and accompanying text (discussing the free agency 
system under the 1976 agreement). 
307. Murray Chass, Information Bank Abstracts, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1980, at 
21; see Jane Leavy, Baseball’s Strike is Almost Certain After Talks Stall, WASH. POST, 
May 22, 1980, at D1. 
308. BERRY, supra note 20, at 66; see Jane Leavy, Strike Is Off, Study Set on 
Compensation, WASH. POST, May 24, 1980, at C1. 
309. BERRY, supra note 20, at 66; see Leavy, supra note 308, at C1. 
310. BERRY, supra note 20, at 66.  The May 22 deadline was allowed to pass 
by the players.  Id.  On May 30, both sides reached a four year agreement.  Id. 
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The four-year labor agreement reached in 1980 left open 
the possibility of a strike in 1981 or 1982.311  The joint la-
bor/management committee was to report its conclusions by 
January 1, 1981.312  If no agreement on free agent compensa-
tion was reached on the basis of that report, the players and 
owners would negotiate the issue for thirty days.313  If no 
agreement was reached after that time, the owners would be 
allowed to unilaterally adopt their final compensation pro-
posal from the 1980 negotiation.314  In that case, the players 
had three options:  (1) to accept the owners’ compensation 
proposal outright; (2) to accept the proposal only for the 
1981 draft, if the owners allowed the players the right to 
strike in 1982; or (3) to strike by June 1, 1981.315 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the joint committee did not re-
solve the free agency issue by January 1, 1981.316  As a result, 
the owners announced in February 1981 their decision to 
implement their free agency compensation plan.317  Follow-
ing this announcement, the MLBPA declared its intention to 
strike on May 29, 1981, unless the two sides could reach a 
compromise.318  When no compromise followed, the strike 
began on June 12, 1981.319 
Fifty days of hostile negotiations eventually led to an 
agreement on July 31, 1981.320  In this agreement, the owners 
 





316. See Joseph Durso, Free Agent Stalemate Is Hinted, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1981, 
§ 5, at 3; Baseball Talks Stalled Over Compensation Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1981, at 
B6. 
317. Red Smith, A Shot Heard Round Baseball, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1981, at B9. 
318. Murray Chass, Player Union Sets May 29 Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 
1981, at D21. 
319. Murray Chass, Long Strike is Feared as Baseball Shuts Down, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 13, 1981, §1, at 1. 
320. Murray Chass, Strike Over, Baseball Resumes August 9, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
1, 1981, § 1, at 1; Jane Leavy, Baseball Begins Again on August 9, WASH. POST, Aug. 
1, 1981, at A1. 
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established a free agent compensation plan while the players 
preserved a free agent system that allowed substantial mo-
bility.321  The free agent system divided premiere free agents 
into two groups, based on player performance over the past 
two years.322  When a team signed a type A free agent, the 
team had to place all but twenty-four of its players in a 
league-wide compensation pool.323  When a team lost a type 
A free agent, that team received an extra selection in the sub-
sequent year’s amateur draft and a player from the compen-
sation pool, although not necessarily from the free agent’s 
new team.324  In contrast, when a team lost a type B free 
agent, that team was compensated by two extra selections in 
the subsequent year’s amateur draft.325 
The 1981 agreement expired at the end of 1984,326 trigger-
ing negotiations during the 1985 season.327  The 1985 nego-
tiations demonstrated a shift in focus from free agency and 
compensation to the owners’ concerns over rapidly escalat-
ing salaries.328  The owners, claiming financial losses that 
threatened several franchises, entered the negotiations with 
proposals for a salary cap and free agent restrictions.329  On 
July 15, 1985, frustrated by the lack of significant progress in 
the negotiations during the preceding months, the MLBPA 
 
321. Thomas Boswell, Owners Pay Maximum For Minimal Victory, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 2, 1981, at F6; Red Smith, The Fight That Nobody Won, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
2, 1981, § 5, at 5; see Chass, supra note 320, at 1; Leavy, supra note 320, at A1. 
322. Leavy, supra note 320, at A1.  Players rated in the top 20% at their posi-
tions were rated A.  Id.  Players in the top 21% to 30% were rated B.  BERRY, supra 
note 20, at 73.  Players with 12 years of major league service were exempt from 
the rankings.  Leavy, supra note 320, at A1. 
323. Leavy, supra note 320, at A1. 
324. BERRY, supra note 20, at 73. 
325. Id.  For complete terms of the settlement see id.; Chass, supra note 320, at 
1; Leavy, supra note 320, at A1; JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 57-59; BERRY, supra 
note 20, at 73. 
326. Chass, supra note 320, at 1. 
327. BERRY, supra note 20, at 262. 
328. See Joseph Durso, Baseball Talks are Opened, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1984, at 
B19; Murray Chass, Baseball’s Tales of Distress, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1984, § 5, at 1; 
JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 61. 
329. See Chass, supra note 328, at 1; BERRY, supra note 20, at 263. 
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set an August 6 strike date.330  Despite this impetus, the 
players and owners resolved only peripheral issues between 
July 15 and the strike date.331  When the strike date arrived, 
no last minute solution surfaced, and the players struck.332 
Although many feared that the 1985 strike would be a 
long one, it turned out, in fact, to be very brief.333  In just two 
days, both sides reached a five-year agreement.334  The own-
ers removed their demand for a salary cap, granted the play-
ers a portion of television revenues, and raised the minimum 
salary.335  The players conceded to a three-year qualification 
for salary arbitration.336  The agreement also provided for a 
return to the pre-1981 free agent compensation policy of 
awarding draft choices as the only means of compensa-
tion.337  This concession by the owners represented a shift in 
position from the 1981 negotiations, during which they 
fought hard to implement a free agent compensation system 
that would cause certain free agent signings to result in a 
major league player being awarded to the old club as com-
pensation.338  The owners’ decision was prompted by the 
 
330. Ross Newhan, Players Set the Strike Date:  August 6, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 
1985, at 3-1. 
331. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 263-64. 
332. Kenneth Reich, Baseball Strike Begins, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1985, at 1-1. 
333. See Ira Berkow, Baseball’s Noose Tightens, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1985, at 
A19; Dave Sell, Baseball Goes Out on Strike, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1985, at A1; Mur-
ray Chass, Baseball Players Begin a Walkout; Games Called Off, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
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L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1985, at 3-1. 
334. Murray Chass, Baseball Strike is Settled; Games to Resume Today, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1985, at A1; Kenneth Reich, Baseball Strike Settled; Play to Resume 
Today, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1985, at 1-1; Terms of the New Baseball Contract, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1985, 3-1; JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 65. 
335. See Chass, supra note 334, at A1; Reich, supra note 334, at 1; Terms of the 
New Baseball Contract, supra note 334, at 1; BERRY, supra note 20, at 265-66; 
JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 65. 
336. Chass, supra, note 334, at A1; Reich, supra note 334, at 1; Terms of the 
New Baseball Contract, supra note 334, at 1; BERRY, supra note 20, at 266. 
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New Baseball Contract, supra note 334, at 1; BERRY, supra note 20, at 267. 
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practical application of the 1981 provision.339  During 1981 
through 1985, only eight players were awarded as compen-
sation.340  Thus, the use of the player pool was sufficiently 
negligible to be abandoned by the owners.341  The issue that 
had sparked the 1981 strike was eviscerated.342 
Free agency had a dramatic effect on player salaries.343  
The average salary, which had been $51,501 before the birth 
of free agency in 1976, became $76,066 the following year, 
and nearly tripled by 1980, reaching $143,756.344  By 1984, the 
average player’s salary had climbed to $329,408.345  Top 
players were paid between $1 and $2 million a season.346  
This upward spiral left owners in a difficult position:  as a 
result of their spending, player salaries were rising dramati-
cally, but the owners were desperate to protect their bottom 
lines.347  Each team realized, however, that the most direct 
solution—saving money by choosing not to acquire free 
agents—would have an equally deleterious effect on their 
bottom lines, because such free agents produced revenue by 
improving the team and thus filling the stands.348  In 1985, 
after unsuccessful attempts to impede salary escalation 
through free agent compensation, restricted player mobility, 
collective bargaining, and litigation, the owners devised a 






343. See JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 190-91. 
344. JERRY GORMAN & KIRK CALHOUN, THE NAME OF THE GAME 152 (1994). 
345. Id. 
346. Id. 
347. Id. at 152-54.  Top players in 1985 were paid between $1 million and $2 
million a season.  Id.  In addition, most had long-term deals.  Id. at 152.  For ex-
ample, in 1981, Dave Winfield signed a ten-year contract with the Yankees, with 
a base salary of $1.4 million, and cost of living adjustments every two years start-
ing in 1982 plus various incentives.  Id.  In 1985, his base salary was up to $1.7 
million.  Id.; see also JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 191-92. 
348. GORMAN & CALHOUN, supra note 344, at 153. 
349. See id.; JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 192. 
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Upon the conclusion of the 1985 season, sixty-two play-
ers became free agents.350  Fifty-seven players re-signed with 
their former teams, while five players signed with new 
teams⎯all for salaries less than their original teams had of-
fered.351  Donald Fehr, president of the MLBPA, charged the 
league with collusion, arguing that each player would no 
longer be dealing with one team, but would now have to 
deal with all twenty-six teams working together.352  Fehr 
cited the following evidence of collusion:  (1) the simultane-
ous decision by all teams to carry one less player during the 
1985 season in order to save money; (2) the unanimous deci-
sion to limit contracts to three-year terms, shortly after the 
owners’ Player Relations Committee circulated a negative 
analysis of player performance after signing long-term con-
tracts; (3) the refusal to include incentive clauses in player 
contracts; and (4) the attempt to insert drug-testing 
clauses.353  These practices continued for two more years, 
prompting the MLBPA to annually file a grievance alleging 
collusion by the owners.354 
These grievances, known as Collusion I, Collusion II, and 
Collusion III, were resolved through arbitration in the sum-
mer of 1990.355  The arbitrators, Tom Roberts in Collusion I, 
and George Nicolau in Collusions II and III, observed sud-
den changes in the owners’ behavior in 1985—during the 
winter of 1984-85, twenty-six of the forty-six free agents 
changed clubs; in 1985-86, only one of thirty-two free agents 
received an offer from a new team.356  Therefore, in each of 
the decisions, the arbitrators found the owners to be in viola-
 
350. JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 193. 
351. Id. 
352. Hal Lancaster, Baseball Players, Owners, Gear Up for New Fight Over Free 
Agency, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1986, at 31. 
353. Id. 
354. See JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 194-99. 
355. Id. 
356. Id. at 194-95. 
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tion of Article XVIII-H of the 1985 labor agreement.357  Con-
sequently, the owners were forced to pay $280 million in 
damages to the players by December 31, 1990.358 
The expiration of the 1985 agreement in 1990 once again 
raised concerns of a work stoppage.359  This time, the owners 
were intent on implementing a new salary system, which 
was based on a revenue sharing plan.360  The owners’ pro-
posal would give players forty-eight percent of gross income 
derived from ticket sales, and radio and television rights.361  
This money would be distributed to players on the basis of a 
wage scale, by which players with less than six years experi-
ence would be paid according to an index tied to perform-
ance, while players with six years or more of major league 
experience would be free to negotiate their own salaries, lim-
ited by the interested team’s payroll.362  If a team exceeded 
the designated percentage, it could not sign free agents from 
other teams.363  The players immediately, and vehemently, 
 
357. GORMAN & CALHOUN, supra note 344, at 154.  Article XVIII-H states: 
The utilization or non-utilization of rights under this Article XVIII is an 
individual matter to be  
determined solely by each Player and each Club for his or its own bene-
fit.  Players shall not act in concert with other Players and Clubs shall 
not act in concert with other Clubs. 
JENNINGS, supra note 81, at 194.  The 1986 free agent Jack Morris—baseball’s most 
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and I’m not doing that . . . . My salary is not the issue here.  The issue is 
that the owners were found guilty of collusion. 
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fact, he swore on his mother’s name about it.  All I can say now is, ‘poor 
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TIMES, Feb. 9, 1990, at A1. 
360. Id. 
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363. Chass, supra note 359, at A1. 
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rejected the proposal as a thinly veiled salary cap.364  The 
players countered by proposing liberalized arbitration eligi-
bility, increased minimum salaries, expanded minimum ros-
ter size, and built-in collusion protection.365  Once again, the 
collective bargaining negotiations left the two sides diamet-
rically opposed.366  Baseball seemed headed for yet another 
work stoppage.367 
On February 15, 1990, the owners implemented a lock-
out.368  The negotiations that followed throughout the thirty-
two day stoppage were intense, but, for the first time, the 
two sides approached the negotiations with mutual respect 
and an absence of hostility and recriminations.369  The labor 
strife of the past twenty years forced the owners and players 
to realize that neither side possessed a marked negotiating 
advantage any longer.370  Both sides believed that bad faith 
bargaining would be fruitless, and would threaten the well-
being of the sport.371 
The players and owners reached a four-year agreement 
on March 18, 1990.372  The owners dropped their demand for 
a salary cap, and the players agreed to the owners’ mini-
mum salary and pension contribution proposal.373  Nonethe-
less, the key issue in reaching the agreement was salary arbi-
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tration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1990, at A1; Ross Newhan, Lockout Ends, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 19, 1990, at C1. 
373. Chass, supra note 372, at A1. 
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tration.374  The agreement liberalized eligibility requirements 
for salary arbitration by extending eligibility to players with 
two years of experience.375  In addition, the agreement pro-
vided that either side might reopen negotiations on certain 
key economic issues, such as free agency, arbitration, and 
minimum salary, after three years.376 
The 1990 season was not significantly affected by the 
lockout.377  Nonetheless, any optimism generated by the 
1990 agreement was quickly stifled on December 7, 1992, 
when the owners exercised their option to reopen the 
agreement for the 1993 season in the areas of free agency, 
salary arbitration, and minimum salary.378  When the nego-
tiations began on January 13, 1993, owners’ representative 
Richard Ravitch announced that he would recommend that 
 
374. See id.; Joseph Durso, Back To Work With Mixed Views, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
20, 1990, at B15; Murray Chass, Baseball Negotiators Cleaning Up Loose Ends, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1990, at B11; Ross Newhan, Major League Baseball:  The Lockout Af-
termath; Anatomy of a Compromise; Behind the Scenes:  With Progress on Arbitration 
Seemingly Hopeless, a Brainstorm Sweeps Away the Last Barrier, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 
1990, at C1. 
375. Chass, supra note 372, at A1; Durso, supra note 374, at B15; Newhan, 
supra note 374, at C1.  This agreement demonstrated significant compromise by 
both sides.  Chass, supra note 372, at A1; Durso, supra note 374, at B15; Newhan, 
supra note 374, at C1.  During the negotiations, the players insisted that the salary 
arbitration requirement be reduced from three to two years, as it had been before 
the 1985 negotiations.  Chass, supra note 372, at A1; Durso, supra note 374, at B15; 
Newhan, supra note 374, at C1.  The owners adamantly resisted reducing the sal-
ary arbitration eligibility requirement from three years.  Chass, supra note 372, at 
A1; Durso, supra note 374, at B15; Newhan, supra note 374, at C1. 
376. Newhan, supra note 374, at C1; Chass, supra note 374, at B11; Chass, su-
pra note 372, at A1. 
377. The start of the 1990 season was postponed from April 2 until April 9.  
Richard Justice, Focus Shifts to Schedule; Season May Run Late, WASH. POST, Mar. 
21, 1990, at F3.  Nevertheless, the season was extended three days to allow each 
team to play a full 162 game schedule.  Ross Newhan, Season Will Be Longer to 
Stay 162, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1990, at C1. 
378. Mark Maske, Baseball Owners Reopen Labor Talks; Spring Lockout Uncer-
tain, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1992, at E1; Murray Chass, Baseball Owners Vote to Re-
open Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1992, at B17; Ross Newhan, Baseball Owners Open 
Door to Talks; Contract:  With Lockout Looming, They Vote, 15-13, to Resume Player 
Negotiations, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1992, at C1. 
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the owners decline to impose a lockout in 1993.379  Although 
no agreement was reached, the 1993 season began as sched-
uled on April 5.380  Despite the absence of an agreement, nei-
ther the players nor owners implemented a work stoppage 
throughout the 1993 season.381  Furthermore, on August 12, 
1993, the owners pledged not to impose a lockout or unilat-
erally change the terms of the CBA before the end of the 
1994 season.382  Nonetheless, when the agreement expired on 
December 31, 1993, the parties were no closer to an agree-
ment than they were a year earlier.  The negotiations contin-
ued through the winter, and the 1994 season began on time.  
Negotiations continued throughout the year, and, on June 
15, the owners presented a salary cap proposal to the play-
ers.383  On July 19, the MLBPA rejected the owners’ proposal, 
but the owners refused to rescind their demand for a salary 
 
379. Murray Chass, Owners’ Labor Agent Doesn’t Favor Lockout, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 14, 1993, at B13; Ross Newhan, Baseball Lockout Deemed Unlikely; Negotiations:  
Owners’ Representative Reopens Bargaining by Saying He Will Recommend Against 
Hostile Threats, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1993, at C2; Mark Maske, Chance of Lockout 
Downplayed; Negotiator Says Owners Want Salary Cap Based on Revenue, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 14, 1993, at D1. 
380. Claire Smith, Baseball:  Opening Day; Ball Drops, Year Starts:  Time for 
Baseball 93, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1993, at C1. 
381. The 1993 season culminated in a dramatic World Series finish, in which 
the Toronto Blue Jays defeated the Philadelphia Phillies, four games to two, to 
capture their second consecutive Title.  The Blue Jays won the deciding game 
eight to six, on Joe Carter’s three-run home run, with one out in the bottom of the 
ninth inning.  Bob Nightengale, World Series; Toronto Blue Jays vs. Philadelphia 
Phillies; Carter Sends Everyone Home; Blue Jays Repeat Crown on Homer in Ninth, 8-
6, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, at C1; Mark Maske, Carter’s Swing Gives Series Smash-
ing Finish; Jays Win 2nd Title on Homer in 9th, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1993, at D1. 
382. Ross Newhan, Owners Still Not in Agreement; Baseball:  They Claim They 
are Closer on Revenue Sharing and Vow For No Lockout in ‘94, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 
1993, at C7; Murray Chass, No Lockout, but a War of the Words, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
14, 1993, § 1, at 27; Mark Maske, ‘93 Strike Unlikely; Pledge Soothes Baseball Players, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1993, at F1. 
383. Ross Newhan, Owners’ Proposal Seeks Salary Cap, 50-50 Revenue Split; 
Baseball:  Plan Also Would End Arbitration; Fehr Not Impressed, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 
1994, at C5; Murray Chass, Owners Unveil Salary Cap Proposal to a Chilly Reception 
From Players, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1994, at B13; Richard Justice, Baseball Proposes 
Salary Cap; Move Heats Up Talk of a Strike, WASH. POST, June 15, 1994, at D1. 
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cap.384  As the end of the season approached, the players 
threatened a strike.385  On August 12, 1994, after one last un-
productive bargaining session, the players went on strike.386  
On September 14, after several unsuccessful negotiating ses-
sions,  the season was canceled.387 
II. THE HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL 
 FOOTBALL 
In contrast to the more structured legal development in 
professional baseball, the employment relationship in pro-
fessional football can be characterized by a simultaneous 
application of contract, antitrust, and labor law principles.388  
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the development 
of the employment relationship in professional football.  
First, this part examines the early years of the National Foot-
ball League (“NFL”), and its attempt to obtain the same anti-
trust immunity as professional baseball.  Second, this part 
 
384. Richard Justice, Strike All But Certain; Baseball Players, Owners Won’t 
Yield on Salary Cap, WASH. POST, July 19, 1994, at E1; Murray Chass, Baseball; 
Owners and Players Stand Still; Clock Runs, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1994, at B9; Ross 
Newhan, Players’ Union Rejects Owners’ Salary Cap; Baseball:  Negotiations Will 
Continue Wednesday, But a Strike Date is Expected By July 31, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 
1994, at C4. 
385. See Ross Newhan, Players Call For Aug. 12 Walkout Date; Baseball:  With 
Season In Jeopardy, Players Have $175-Million Strike Fund, and Owners Face Loss of 
$140 Million in Postseason Revenue, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1994, at C1; Murray Chass, 
Players’ Association Sets Strike Date of Aug. 12, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1994, at B9. 
386. Murray Chass, No Runs, No Hits, No Errors:  Baseball Goes on Strike, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at A1; Richard Justice, With Baseball’s Last Out; a Strike, 
Players Walk Off Job After Failing to Agree With Owners, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1994, 
at A1; Ross Newhan, Owners Gripe as Baseball Strike Begins, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 
1994, at A1. 
387. Murray Chass, Owners Terminate Season, Without the World Series, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at A1; Mark Maske, Baseball Season Wiped Out; Team Owners 
Cancel Remaining Schedule and World Series, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1994, at A1; 
Ross Newhan, Baseball Season, Series Canceled; Sports:  Owners Say Failure to Reach 
Bargaining Accord and 34-Day Players’ Strike Made it Impossible to Resume Play.  
World Series Won’t Be Played for First Time Since 1904, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1994, at 
A1. 
388. Cf. BERRY, supra note 20, at 87-123 (discussing the history of 
employment relations in professional football). 
    
346 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [7:295 
considers the nonstatutory labor exemption to the Sherman 
Act, which the NFL employed to circumvent antitrust con-
straints.  Finally, this part examines the development of em-
ployment relations between owners and players from the in-
ception of the National Football League Players’ Association 
(“NFLPA”) to the present. 
A. The National Football Leagues’ Early Struggles and It’s 
Press for Antitrust Immunity 
 The NFL, which first commenced operations in 1920,389 
did not appear in labor litigation until the 1950s.390  The first 
twelve years of the league’s existence were largely domi-
nated by the sport’s quest for professional viability.391  Dur-
ing this period, there was little stability in the league.392  
Owners constantly formed and dissolved league franchises 
throughout the “season,” which often lacked a set sched-
ule.393  This constant state of flux dominated the league until 
1936, the first year in which the NFL finished the season 
with all of the franchises with which it had started and the 
first year in which all the teams in the league played the 
same number of games.394  Given the turmoil of this period, 
the NFL imposed virtually no mobility restraints on play-
ers.395 
During the 1950s, football’s popularity and profitability 
 
389. Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory, 63 TUL. L. 
REV. 751, 756-57 (1989).  The league was founded in 1920 under the name 
“American Professional Football Association”.  Id.  In 1922 the league adopted its 
current name, “National Football League.”  Id. 
390. BERRY, supra note 20, at 96. 
391. Id. at 89. 
392. Id. 
393. Id. 
394. Id. at 91. 
395. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 89-90.  During the early years of the NFL, 
teams were more concerned with financial viability than success.  See id.  During 
the 1921 season, several teams disbanded, and others formed to begin play as the 
season was in progress.  Id.  Twenty-three different teams played all or part of 
the year.  Id.  From 1922 to 1932 there was constant franchise movement in and 
out of the league.  Id.  The NFL membership grew to 22 teams in 1926 and 
dropped to eight during the 1932 season.  BERRY, supra note 20, at 89-90. 
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swelled.396  In the wake of this growing public interest in the 
sport, the NFL pressed courts for the same antitrust immu-
nity that baseball enjoyed.397  In United States v. National 
Football League,398 a federal court in Pennsylvania held that 
radio and television broadcasts of professional football were 
subject to the Sherman Act.399  In National Football, the gov-
ernment sought to enjoin the enforcement of Article X of the 
NFL By-laws,400 which provided teams with exclusive 
broadcast rights within their respective home territories.401  
Finding that Article X was illegal under the Sherman Act, the 
court explained that radio and television, which broadcasted 
NFL games across state lines, clearly affected interstate 
commerce.402  As a result, the court held that Article X was 
subject to antitrust constraints.403  In so holding, the court re-
jected the notion that professional football, like professional 
 
396. Id. at 91. 
397. See id. at 92.  During this period all of the major professional team 
sports pressed for antitrust immunity and failed.  See Philadelphia World 
Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Bos-
ton Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972), 
rev’d, 472 F.2d 127 (1972); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 
1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
398. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). 
399. Id. at 321, 327-28, 330. 
400. Id. at 321. 
401. Id. 
402. Id. at 327.  The court reached this conclusion without considering 
whether professional football itself was engaged in interstate commerce.  Na-
tional Football League, 116 F. Supp. at 327.  The court also stated that “[s]ince the 
League by-laws restrict substantially something which is in interstate commerce 
it is immaterial whether professional football by itself is commerce interstate 
commerce.”  Id. at 327-28.  On this point, the court quoted the United State Su-
preme Court’s decision in United States v. Women’s Sportswear Ass’n, 336 U.S. 
460, 464 (1949): 
Restraints, to be effective, do not have to be applied all along the line of 
movement of interstate commerce.  The source of the restraint may be 
intrastate, as the making of a contract or combination usually is; the ap-
plication of the restraint may be intrastate, as it often is; but neither mat-
ters if the necessary effect is to stifle or restrain commerce among the 
states.  If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter 
how local the operation which applies the squeeze. 
Id. at 328. 
403. Id. at 327-28. 
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baseball, was exempt from antitrust law.404 
In 1957, the NFL’s quest for antitrust immunity reached 
the Supreme Court in Radovich v. National Football League.405  
Bill Radovich, a player blacklisted by the NFL, sued the 
league for treble damages, alleging a conspiracy to monopo-
lize interstate commerce in the business of professional foot-
ball.406  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had dismissed 
the complaint, relying on Federal Baseball, and held that foot-
ball was not interstate commerce under the Sherman Act.407  
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Federal Baseball’s 
antitrust exemption was expressly limited to professional 
baseball.408  The Court reasoned that its determination in 
Federal Baseball of whether a particular business is subject to 
the Sherman Act was based on the volume of interstate ac-
tivity involved in the business under review.409  The Radovich 
Court held that the amount of interstate activity involved in 
 
404. Id. at 328.  The court, discussing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Fed-
eral Baseball and Toolson, said: 
The only question involved in those cases was whether professional 
baseball itself is interstate commerce.  No question of restrictions on the 
sale of radio and television rights was involved in those cases.  The pre-
sent case, on the other hand, primarily concerns restrictions imposed by 
the National Football League on the sale of radio and television rights.  
Therefore, the present case basically concerns the League’s restraint of 
interstate commerce in the radio and television industries.  It is obvious 
that whether professional football itself is or is not engaged in interstate 
commerce is immaterial in the present case and that the decisions in the 
baseball cases referred to do not control the present case. 
Id. 
405. 352 U.S. 445 (1957). 
406. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 445. 
407. Radovich v. National Football League, 231 F.2d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 1956), 
rev’d, 352 U.S. 445. 
408. See Radovich, 352 U.S. at 451.  The Court reiterated its holding in United 
States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955), that the decision in Fed-
eral Baseball “could not be relied upon as a basis of exemption for other segments 
of the entertainment business, athletic or otherwise. . . .”  International Boxing 
Club, 348 U.S. at 242-43, quoted in Radovich, 352 U.S. at 451.  In addition, the Court 
once again failed to address baseball’s antitrust exemption and added that any 
inconsistency in their decision was to be resolved by Congress.  Radovich, 352 
U.S. at 449-52. 
409. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 451. 
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professional football, unlike professional baseball, was suffi-
cient to draw the sport within the protection of the Sherman 
Act.410  The Court based this determination on the fact that 
the league scheduled a great number of games in various 
metropolitan areas, and that the revenues raised from inter-
state radio and television broadcast contracts produced a 
significant portion of the league’s gross profits.411 
Despite the players’ victory in Radovich, the NFL was still 
able to unilaterally control the employment relationship.412  
After Radovich, the owners restricted the rights of players 
with devices such as the Rozelle Rule,413 and the amateur 
draft,414 both of which were implemented under the non-
statutory labor exception to the Sherman Act.415  It was not 
until the players resorted to union tactics that the gains of 
Radovich were realized. 
B. The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption to the Sherman Act 
The Supreme Court has encouraged collective bargaining 
under the NLRA416 by creating a nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion to the Sherman Act.417  This exemption extends antitrust 
immunity to collective bargaining agreements made by labor 
 
410. Id. at 452. 
411. Id. at 449, 453-54. 
412. See infra part II.C (discussing development of the employment relations 
between owners and players in professional football after the formation of the 
NFLPA). 
413. See infra notes 455-66 and accompanying text (discussing football’s Ro-
zelle Rule). 
414. See supra note 58 (describing the draft); infra notes 498-502 and 
accompanying text (discussing the invalidation of the draft on antitrust 
grounds). 415. Under the nonstatutory labor exception to the Sherman Act, agree-
ments that would otherwise constitute illegal combinations in restraint of trade 
are immunized from antitrust law if they were reached through collective bar-
gaining.  See WARREN FREEDMAN, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND ANTITRUST 49-52 
(1987). 
416. See supra part I.C.1 (discussing the NLRA). 
417. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 
421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975) (holding that the nonstatutory labor exemption finds the 
proper balance between two competing congressional policies, collective bar-
gaining under the NLRA and free competition in business markets). 
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unions and nonunion groups.418  The Supreme Court has de-
fined the scope of the exemption in three leading cases:  
United Mine Workers v. Pennington,419 Local Union No. 189, 
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea 
Co.,420 and Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters 
Local No. 100.421 
In Pennington, the Court rejected the assertion that a col-
lective bargaining agreement would automatically receive a 
nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust laws.422  The 
case arose out of an attempt to control the production of coal 
through an agreement between the United Mine Workers 
and various coal producers.423  The Court held that an 
agreement between a union and an employer cannot affect 
an entire industry.424  The Court reasoned that the protection 
provided by the federal labor policy encouraged by the non-
statutory labor exemption extended only to legitimate union 
goals.425  As a result, the Pennington Court concluded that 
union control of product markets was not a legitimate 
goal.426 
The Court’s reasoning in Pennington was clarified in Jewel 
Tea.  In Jewel Tea, the Court held that a restriction on market-
 
418. Id. 
419. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
420. 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (superseded by statute as stated in Brotherhood of 
Maintenance of Way Employees v. Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc., 803 F.2d 1228 
(1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, Delaware H.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of 
Way Employees, 481 U.S. 1037 (1987)). 
421. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). 
422. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664-65. 
423. Id. at 659-60.  The mine workers and several large coal producers con-
sidered overproduction of coal a serious concern, and agreed to eliminate 
smaller companies with this agreement.  Id.  The agreement included increased 
wages, which the union agreed to impose on other coal producers regardless of 
their ability to pay the increased costs.  Id. at 660. 
424. Id. at 666.  The Court stated, “there is nothing in the labor policy indi-
cating that the union and the employers in one bargaining unit are free to bar-
gain about the wages, hours, and working conditions of other bargaining units or 
to attempt to settle these matters for the entire industry.”  Id. 
425. Id. at 665-67. 
426. Id. at 664-64. 
    
1996] BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION 351 
ing hours included in a CBA between the union and various 
meat retailers qualified for a nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion.427  The Court employed a balancing test that weighed 
the relative impact of the agreement on the product market 
against the agreement’s benefits to the union members.428  
The Court held that because the agreement resulted from 
bona-fide, arms-length negotiations and did not involve a 
non-labor group, its ancillary effects on the product market 
were insufficient to negate the agreement.429 
The Supreme Court further refined the Jewel Tea balanc-
ing test in Connell.430  In evaluating a hot cargo agreement,431 
the Connell court determined that the market restraints im-
posed by the agreement exceeded those allowable under the 
Jewel Tea balancing approach.432  The Court held that a col-
lective bargaining agreement that substantially affected 
market conditions, without promoting legitimate union in-
terests, was not entitled to antitrust immunity.433 
The standard of applicability of the nonstatutory labor 
exemption can therefore be condensed into three require-
ments:  (1) the restraint must primarily affect only the parties 
to the agreement; (2) the restraint must be concerned with a 
mandatory subject of bargaining; and (3) the restraint must 
be a product of bona-fide arms-length negotiations.434  Al-
though these requirements limit the availability of the ex-
emption, they have nevertheless provided owners with a 
means for implementing restrictive measures that otherwise 
 
427. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. at 689-90. 
428. Id. at 690-92; see id. at 690 n.5. 
429. Id. at 689-90. 
430. Connell, 421 U.S. at 622. 
431. Id. at 618-21.  The hot cargo agreement was a collective bargaining 
agreement between the union and local contractors requiring the contractors to 
hire only subcontractors who were parties to the agreement.  Id. 
432. Id. at 621-26. 
433. Id. at 626. 
434. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976), 
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). 
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would violate antitrust laws.435 
C. The Players Unionize 
In an effort to overcome the restrictions imposed by the 
owners and to protect their interests against the owners, the 
players unionized in 1956.436  The strength of the players’ 
union, the National Football League Players Association 
(“NFLPA”), however, has been limited due to weak player 
solidarity since its inception.437  Strike attempts in 1956 and 
1959 were aborted by the NFLPA when it became clear that 
the players were not unified.438  It was not until 1968 that the 
NFL experienced its first full scale strike.439  In 1968, dis-
puted issues included player mobility, minimum salary, and 
owner pension contributions.440  When negotiations reached 
an impasse during preseason training camp, the players 
went on strike.441  The owners retaliated with a lockout.442  
The strike and lockout ended quickly, resulting in an agree-
ment between the parties after only ten days.443 
The expiration of the 1968 agreement in January 1970 re-
sulted in another work stoppage.444  The players demanded  
increased pension contributions, increased postseason com-
 
435. See infra notes 455-66 and accompanying text (discussing football’s Ro-
zelle Rule); infra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing football’s draft). 
436. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 96. 
437. See infra note 438 and accompanying text (discussing aborted strike at-
tempts in 1956 and 1959); infra notes 467-70 and accompanying text (discussing 
the 1974 strike); infra notes 473-78 (discussing the 1975 strike); infra notes 540-48 
and accompanying text (discussing the 1987 strike). 
438. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 124. 
439. Glen St. Louis, Keeping the Playing Field Level:  The Implications, Effects 
and Application of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption on the 1994 National Basketball 
Association Collective Bargaining Process, 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1221, 1229 (1993). 
440. BERRY, supra note 20, at 124. 
441. Id. 
442. Id.; see supra note 282 (defining lockout as the employer’s correlative to 
the employee’s strike). 
443. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 124.  The focus of the 1968 agreement was 
the pension contribution, and the settlement was primarily a coming together of 
the owners’ and players’ demands.  Id.  The free agency issue was secondary and 
did not factor into the settlement.  See id. 
444. St. Louis, supra note 439, at 1229. 
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pensation, and a grievance procedure.445  After fruitless ne-
gotiations, the players struck again during their July training 
camp.446  The owners imposed a lockout three days later.447  
The strike and lockout ended after twenty days, when the 
owners agreed to increased pension contributions over four 
years.448  Once again, the issue of player mobility did not fac-
tor into the settlement.449 
When the 1970 agreement expired in 1974, the players 
went on strike for the third time.450  This time, however, is-
sues concerning player mobility were the focus of the 
NFLPA’s efforts.451  The players sought to eliminate meas-
ures such as the reserve list, the option clause, the college 
draft, and the waiver system.452  The primary focus of the 
NFLPA’s efforts, however, was the elimination of the Ro-
zelle Rule,453 which had severely restricted player movement 
in the 1960s and 1970s.454 
 
445. Id; BERRY, supra note 20, at 125.  Unlike baseball players, NFL players 





449. See St. Louis, supra note 439, at 1229.  The players raised objections to 
the Rozelle Rule, but it remained when the strike was settled.  Id. 
450. Dickerson, supra note 70, at 169. 
451. See id.; St. Louis, supra note 439, at 1229. 
452. See Dickerson, supra note 70, at 169. 
453. The Rozelle Rule was embodied in § 12.1(H) of the NFL Constitution & 
Bylaws.  Section 12.1(H) stated: 
Any player, whose contract with a League club has expired, shall there-
upon become a free agent, and shall no longer be considered a member 
of the team of that club following the expiration date of such contract.  
Whenever a player, becoming a free agent in such manner, thereafter 
signed a contract with a different club in the League, then, unless mutu-
ally satisfactory arrangements have been concluded between the two 
League clubs, the Commissioner may name and then award to the for-
mer club one or more players, from . . . the acquiring club as the Com-
missioner in his sole discretion deems fair and equitable; any such deci-
sion by the commissioner shall be final and conclusive. 
NFL Constitution and Bylaws 12.1(H), quoted in Mackey v. National Football 
League, 543 F.2d 606, 610-11 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). 
454. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 125. 
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The Rozelle Rule was conceived by, and named after, 
then-NFL commissioner Alvin Ray “Pete” Rozelle in 1963.455  
The Rozelle Rule bound a player to a team for two years, af-
ter which time he could become a free agent.456  The Rozelle 
Rule, however, required any club signing a free agent to 
compensate the player’s former team.457  If the two teams 
could not reach an agreement, the commissioner had discre-
tion to unilaterally award “equal compensation” to the 
player’s former team.458  Such compensation could include 
players, draft choices, or cash.459 
In practice, the Rozelle Rule denied players the opportu-
nity to market their services to other teams in the league.460  
Signing a player who had played out his option was risky 
because teams never knew what penalty the commissioner 
would impose.461  For example, Dave Parks, an all-pro wide 
receiver for the San Francisco Forty-Niners, played out the 
option year of his contract and subsequently signed with the 
New Orleans Saints.462  As compensation for the team’s loss, 
Commissioner Rozelle ordered the Saints to give the Forty-
Niners the team’s first-round draft choices for both 1968 and 
1969.463  Harsh penalties, such as the one suffered by the 
Saints, made teams reluctant to sign free agents, and effec-
tively stifled player movement among teams.464  In fact, from 
1963 to 1976, 176 players played out their options.465  Of 
 
455. Staudohar, supra note 214, at 87. 
456. Truelock, supra note 20, at 1925-26; STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 87-88; 
see Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610. 
457. Truelock, supra note 20, at 1926; see NFL Constitution and Bylaws, supra 
note 453, 12.1(H). 
458. Truelock, supra note 20, at 1926; see NFL Constitution and Bylaws, supra 
note 453, 12.1(H); STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 87-88. 
459. STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 87-88. 
460. See id.; BERRY, supra note 20 at 125. 
461. See Truelock, supra note 20, at 1926; STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 88. 
462. STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 88. 
463. Id. 
464. See Truelock, supra note 20, at 1926; STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 87-
88. 
465. STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 87-88. 
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these 176 players, however, only four signed with other 
clubs under circumstances in which the Commissioner 
awarded compensation.466 
Despite the NFLPA’s ambitious approach in 1974, the 
strike did not go as planned.467  Rookies and free agents fre-
quently “crossed the picket lines.”468  Within a month, ap-
proximately 311 out of 1200 veteran players had rejoined 
NFL teams.469  After forty-two days, in the face of over-
whelming public support for the owners, the strike quietly 
ended.470 
The players completed the 1974 season without a CBA.471  
As the start of the 1975 season approached, the sides were 
far from reaching an agreement.472  Once again the players 
voted to strike.473  The initial decision to strike was made by 
five individual teams acting independently.474  In the wake 
of these initial strike votes, each of the twenty-six teams in 
the league conducted independent strike votes.475  Eleven 
teams voted not to strike.476  The players’ inability to act col-
lectively left the union in a weak position.477  Neither the 
public nor the owners took the players’ demands seriously, 
and consequently the strike quickly ended before a single 
 
466. The players were Pat Fischer, David Parks, Phil Olson, and Dick Gor-
don.  STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 87-88.  Only 34 of the 176 players signed 
with other teams, with the clubs reaching mutually agreed upon compensation 
in 27 of those cases.  Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611. 
467. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 125-26. 
468. Id. 
469. Id. at 126. 
470. See id.; Dickerson, supra note 70, at 167 n.6; St. Louis, supra note 439, at 
1229. 
471. See Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 359 (1989). 
472. BERRY, supra note 20, at 126. 
473. Lock, supra note 471, at 360. 
474. BERRY, supra note 20, at 126.  The initial teams to strike were the New 
England Patriots, Detroit Lions, Washington Redskins, New York Giants, and 
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regular season game was canceled.478  Once again the own-
ers and players failed to reach an agreement.479 
The NFL operated without a CBA from 1974 to 1977.480  
The NFLPA, realizing that the players lack of solidarity had 
rendered union tactics ineffective, opted to revisit the anti-
trust challenge through litigation.481  The prime targets were 
the league’s two primary restrictions on player mobility:  the 
draft and the Rozelle Rule.482 
The first legal challenge to the Rozelle Rule was the 1974 
case, Kapp v. National Football League.483  In Kapp, a federal 
court in California held that the Rozelle Rule placed an un-
reasonable restraint on trade due to its scope, duration, and 
the excessive power given to the Commissioner.484  The 
court noted, however, that while the monopolistic combina-
tions utilized by the NFL would constitute per se antitrust 
violations in other businesses, the uniqueness of professional 
sports required the application of a reasonableness stan-
dard.485  The court applied a reasonableness test and con-
 
478.  BERRY, supra note 20, at 126. 
479. Id. 
480. See Lock, supra note 471, at 359.  During this period the league operated 
under the terms of the expired 1970 agreement.  BERRY, supra note 20, at 126. 
481. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 126. 
482. Id. 
483. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff’d, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979).  Joe Kapp, a quarterback for the Minnesota Vikings, 
played out his contract in 1969 and became a free agent when he declined to re-
sign with the Vikings.  Id.  Although other teams were interested in his services, 
no offers were forthcoming.  Id.  Kapp eventually signed with the New England 
Patriots, who compensated the Vikings, but he was later forced to sit out because 
he refused to sign a Standard Player Contract which would bind him to all of the 
league’s rules.  Id. at 77. 
484. Id. at 82.  According to the Kapp court: 
[A] rule imposing restraint virtually unlimited in time and extent, goes 
far beyond any possible need for fair protection of the interests of the 
club-employers or the purposes of the NFL and . . . imposes upon the 
player-employees such undue hardship as to be an unreasonable re-
straint. 
390 F. Supp. at 82. 
485. Id. at 81.  Kapp argued that the draft, the option rule, the Rozelle Rule, 
and other restrictive rules of the NFL constitution and by-laws constituted a 
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cluded that the contractual restrictions on Kapp’s right to 
pursue his profession were patently unreasonable.486  On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this deci-
sion.487 
In 1975, the NFLPA challenged the Rozelle Rule in 
Mackey v. National Football League.488  In Mackey, a federal 
court in Minnesota held that the Rozelle Rule violated the 
Sherman Antitrust Act and was therefore an illegal restraint 
of trade.489  The Mackey court based its decision primarily on 
the per se rule,490 but alternately held that the Rozelle Rule 
was invalid under the reasonableness standard.491  Further-
more, the court dismissed the league’s contention that the 
rule was immune from antitrust law under the nonstatutory 
labor exception of the Sherman act.492 
The basic holding of the trial court in Mackey was upheld 
on appeal,493 but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explic-
itly rejected the per se approach and adopted the reasonable-
                                                                                                                                  
combination among defendants to refuse to deal with players except under the 
stated condition—in effect a boycott or blacklist—and as such was a per se viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.  Id.  Kapp alternately argued that the rules in question 
constituted an illegal combination under a reasonableness interpretation of the 
Sherman Act, which allows only combinations that are reasonably necessary to 
achieve the business goals of the employer.  Id.  The league countered by arguing 
that the rules did not constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act, and that 
even if they amounted to an antitrust violation under the reasonableness stan-
dard, they were immunized from antitrust laws by having been the subject or 
result of collective bargaining (The Nonstatutory Labor Exception).  Id. at 78-79. 
486. Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 86. 
487. Kapp, 586 F.2d at 650. 
488. 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn 1975), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 543 F.2d 606 
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). 
489. Id. at 1007. 
490. See supra note 485 and accompanying text (discussing the per se stan-
dard). 
491. Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1007; see supra note 485 and accompanying text 
(discussing the rule of reason standard). 
492. Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1008-10.  The court reasoned that the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption could not be applied where an anti-competitive provision 
was unilaterally imposed upon a weak union.  Id. at 1010; see supra note 415 and 
accompanying text (discussing the nonstatutory labor exemption). 
493. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623. 
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ness standard for all player restraints.494  The appellate court 
agreed with Kapp, holding that the Rozelle Rule violated an-
titrust law as an unreasonable restraint of trade, as it was 
unreasonably broad in its application, lacked procedural 
safeguards, and substantially restricted player mobility.495  
In addition, the appellate court set forth three prerequisites 
for the application of the nonstatutory labor exception, re-
quiring that the restraint:  (1) primarily affect only the par-
ties to the collective bargaining relationship; (2) concern a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining; and (3) be the 
product of bona fide, arms-length negotiation.496  In Mackey, 
the NFL’s failure to satisfy the third prong prevented it from 
claiming the benefit of the exemption.497 
On the heels of the Mackey decision, the owners suffered 
another defeat in Smith v. Pro-Football.498  In Smith, the NFL’s 
college draft system was held to violate the Sherman Act.499  
The owners’ attempt to fit the draft within the nonstatutory 
 
494. Id. at 619.  Chief Judge Lay explained: 
[T]he NFL assumes some of the characteristics of a joint venture in that 
each member club has a stake in the success of the other teams . . . . Al-
though businessmen cannot wholly evade the antitrust laws by charac-
terizing their operation as a joint venture, we conclude that the unique 
nature of the business of professional football renders it inappropriate 
to mechanically apply per se illegality rules . . . . This is particularly true 
where, as here, the alleged restraint does not completely eliminate 
competition for players’ services . . . . In similar circumstances, when 
faced with a unique or novel business situation, courts have eschewed a 
per se analysis in favor of an inquiry into the reasonableness of the re-
strain under the circumstances. 
Id. (citations omitted).  According to the Mackey court, “[i]t may be that some rea-
sonable restrictions relating to player transfers are necessary for the successful 
operation of the NFL.”  Id. at 623. 
495. Id. at 622. 
496. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614. 
497. Id. at 616.  Applying the three prong test to the facts in Mackey, the 
court concluded that the Rozelle Rule satisfied the first two prongs.  Id. at 615.  
However, the court accepted the lower court’s findings that the Rozelle Rule was 
thrust upon a weak union, and that the players did not receive direct or indirect 
benefit for agreeing to the restraint.  Id. at 616.  Therefore, the exemption could 
not be applied.  Id. 
498. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), modified, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
499. Id. at 744. 
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labor exception of the Sherman Act failed.500  The court 
found that the draft system was a mandatory subject of col-
lective bargaining, and was qualified for antitrust immunity 
under the nonstatutory labor exemption.501  The Smith court, 
however, held that the draft system was not entitled to im-
munity from antitrust review because it was “an outright, 
undisguised refusal to deal constitut[ing] a group boycott in 
its classic and most pernicious form.”502 
The Mackey and Smith decisions were significant victories 
for the NFLPA, allowing greater mobility for players.503  In-
stead of fortifying their gains in the 1977 CBA, however, the 
NFLPA negotiated most of them away.504 
The 1977 CBA provided for a system of free agency 
known as the Right of First Refusal/Compensation system 
(“RFR/C system”).505  Under the RFR/C system, a player be-
 
500. Id. at 742.  The court rejected the owner’s contention that any agree-
ment resulting from union-employer negotiations relating to a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining is automatically exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny.  Id.  The 
court reasoned that the policy of the nonstatutory labor exemption, “allowing the 
collective bargaining process, proceeding unfettered by antitrust restraints, to 
determine wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment,” is not 
served by extending the exemption to agreements unilaterally imposed by em-
ployers.  Id. 
501. Id. at 744. 
502. Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 744.  The court further stated: 
The essence of the draft is straightforward:  the owners of the teams 
have agreed among themselves that the right to negotiate with each top 
quality graduating college athlete will be allocated to one team, and that 
no other team will deal with that person.  This outright, undisguised re-
fusal to deal constitutes a group boycott in its classic and most perni-
cious form, a device which has long been condemned as a per se viola-
tion of the antitrust laws . . . . There is no question but that the 
restrictions comprising the draft “are naked restraints of trade with no 
purpose except stifling of competition.” 
Id. at 744-45 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (cita-
tions omitted). 
503. See STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 88-92; BERRY, supra note 20, at 105, 
127. 
504. Chalian, supra note 20, at 616; see BERRY, supra note 20, at 127; 
STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 88. 
505. Truelock, supra note 20, at 1930.  After Mackey, the NFLPA and the NFL 
Management Council did collectively bargain.  Robbins, supra note 20, at 955.  
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came a free agent when his contract expired or when he 
played out his option year.506  Nevertheless, a free agent’s 
mobility was limited by two restrictions:  (1) the free agent’s 
team had the option to match any offer made to a player and 
to retain his services, and (2) even if the free agent’s team re-
fused to match an offer, the team was still entitled to com-
pensation from the acquiring team in the form of future 
amateur draft choices.507  During the five years in which the 
1977 agreement was in effect, only six of over 500 NFL play-
ers who became free agents under the agreement actually 
changed teams.508  Except for stripping the Commissioner of 
his discretionary power to determine compensation, the 
RFR/C was the reincarnation of the Rozelle Rule.509 
Professor Berry contends that the NFLPA’s reason for 
“negotiating away” the gains of Mackey rest upon the as-
sumption that free agency is of little value to football play-
ers.510  Berry argues that this rationale is based on the eco-
nomics and nature of football, compared to other 
professional team sports, and assumes first, that owners 
have little incentive to sign free agents because of their un-
certain impact on winning games, and second, that revenues 
are secure regardless of team personnel.511 
                                                                                                                                  
The RFR/C system was first developed during these negotiations.  Id. 
506. BERRY, supra note 20, at 127.  Playing out an option usually meant that 
an unsigned player was retained by his club for one additional year at 110% of 
his salary in the previous year.  Following the option year, a player could be-
come a free agent.  Id. 
507. Truelock, supra note 20, at 1931. 
508. BERRY, supra note 20, at 127.  In fact, fewer than 50 players were even 
given offers from other NFL teams after receiving free agent status.  Truelock, 
supra note 20, at 1931. 
509. Robbins, supra note 20, at 955; see Chalian, supra note 20, at 616-17. 
510. BERRY, supra note 20, at 134. 
511. Id.  Berry argues that the first assumption is probably valid.  Unlike 
other team sports, in which teams are smaller and individual performance is 
magnified, individual football players have less impact on overall team success.  
For example, in baseball, a pitcher can practically win or lose a game by himself.  
In football, no one player can have so great an impact on the outcome of a game 
without help from other players.  A great receiver cannot excel without a good 
quarterback, and conversely, a great quarterback cannot excel without a good 
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The 1977 agreement expired in 1982.512  The players, with 
the memory of their failure in the 1977 negotiations fresh in 
their minds, were intent on taking a hard line.513  A number 
of factors strengthened the players’ resolve.  One was the 
formation of the rival United States Football League 
(“USFL”) in 1982.514  The USFL, which was bolstered by 
wealthy owners and a two-year television contract with 
ABC, removed the NFL owners’ monopoly on setting player 
salaries.515  The NFL was faced with competition that it 
could not control.516  Players could jump to the USFL when 
their NFL contracts expired.517  The NFL team that suffered 
the loss was not entitled to any form of compensation be-
cause the USFL was not subject to the NFL’s compensation 
rules.518 
In addition, the players were encouraged by the success 
of the 1981 baseball strike.519  After the baseball strike, player 
salaries continued to rise and fan attendance returned to re-
cord levels.520  The lasting solidarity of the baseball players 
showed the NFL players that similar results could be 
achieved if they remained firm.521  Thus, when the NFLPA 
approached the owners with its demands in 1982, they were 
more committed to their cause than ever before and they 
were ready to fight to achieve their goals.522 
                                                                                                                                  
offensive line and receivers.  A team which has all the best offensive personnel 
may still fail because it lacks a quality defense.  Therefore, in football, having the 
highest payroll does not ensure success.  In 1981, only one of the five highest 
paying teams in the NFL qualified for the playoffs. 
512. Lock, supra note 471, at 361. 
513. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 128. 
514. Id. 
515. Id. at 129. 
516. See STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 89. 
517. See id. 
518. Id. 
519. BERRY, supra note 20, at 130; see supra notes 318-25 and accompanying 
text (discussing the 1981 baseball players’ strike). 
520. BERRY, supra note 20, at 130. 
521. Id. 
522. See id. 
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In 1982, the players wanted a larger share of the NFL’s 
revenue.523  They demanded that a percentage of annual 
gross team revenues be distributed among the players via a 
wage scale.524  The wage scale would have distributed the 
percentage of gross team revenues to the players on the basis 
of seniority and objective performance criteria.525  The union 
hoped that this system would discourage teams from cutting 
older players and replacing them with younger ones.526  In 
addition, the union sought to eliminate the inequity between 
the salaries of players who occupied high profile positions 
and players who did not, although both essentially did the 
same work—play professional football.527 
In the 1982 negotiations, the NFLPA demanded, regard-
ing free agency, that all cut players automatically become 
free agents and not go through waivers, and that a player 
become a free agent every three years unless he voluntarily 
agree to stay with his team.528  The union did not place much 
emphasis on these points, however, opting instead to focus 
on their demands for a percentage of gross revenues and a 
wage scale.529 
Although negotiations produced no agreement, the 1982 
season started on time.530  Nevertheless, on September 21, 
1982, two weeks into the season, the players went out on 
strike.531  After fifty-five days, the strike ended when the 
sides reached a five-year agreement.532  The season resumed 
on November 21.533 
 
523. Id. at 131. 
524. Lock, supra note 471, at 361-62. 
525. Id. at 362. 
526. See BERRY, supra note 20, at 133-34. 
527. See id.  In 1982 the average salary for a quarterback was $160,037.  Id. at 
134.  The average salary for an offensive lineman was $85,543.  Id. 
528. Id. at 135. 
529.  BERRY, supra note 20, at 135. 
530. See id. at 136-37. 
531. Id. at 137. 
532. St. Louis, supra note 439, at 1232-33; Lock, supra note 471, at 362. 
533. BERRY, supra note 20, at 146.  The season was rejoined as scheduled, and 
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The five-year agreement favored the owners.534  The 
players dropped their demand for a percentage of gross 
team revenues.535  Free agency was liberalized by lowering 
compensation awards, but, for the most part, the RFR/C sys-
tem remained unchanged.536  In fact, during the five years in 
which the 1982 agreement was in effect, only one of ap-
proximately 1400 players who became free agents received 
an offer from another team.537  A minimum wage scale was 
adopted; it established a minimum salary for players based 
on seniority, starting at $30,000 for rookies and ending at 
$200,000 for sixteen year veterans.538  The players also re-
ceived pension and insurance benefits.539  The 1982 agree-
ment did not alter the employment relationship much, but it 
did alert both the players and the owners to each other’s 
strength.540 
When the 1982 agreement expired in 1987, the members 
of the NFLPA once again went on strike.541  This time, how-
ever, the owners were able to take an intransigent position 
because their bargaining position had improved significantly 
since 1982.542  The USFL had collapsed the year before, and 
the owners no longer feared losing players and public sup-
                                                                                                                                  
one makeup game was added.  Id.  Counting the two games played prior to the 
strike, the regular season was nine games.  Id.  Instead of the ten teams that nor-
mally qualified for the playoffs (six division champions and four wild-card en-
tries), the number of teams qualifying for the playoffs was increased to 16.  Id. at 
146-47.  The Super Bowl was played on January 30, 1983, as originally scheduled.  
Id. at 147. 
534. See STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 77; St. Louis, supra note 439, at 1233; 
Lock, supra note 471, at 365; BERRY, supra note 20, at 146. 
535. Lock, supra note 471, at 365. 
536. Id.; St. Louis, supra note 439, at 1233; BERRY, supra note 20, at 146. 
537. Truelock, supra note 20, at 1931.  In 1988, Wilbur Marshall moved from 
the Chicago Bears to the Washington Redskins in exchange for two first round 
draft choices.  Chalian, supra note 20, at 616-17 n.161. 
538. BERRY, supra note 20, at 144. 
539. Id. 
540. Id. 
541. Lock, supra note 471, at 367; St. Louis, supra note 439, at 1233; Chalian, 
supra note 20, at 617; Truelock, supra note 20, at 1931. 
542. STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 79. 
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port to the rival league.543  Thus, when negotiations broke 
down and the union threatened to strike, the owners de-
cided to take the hard line with a revised strategy:  stonewall 
in negotiations, use the NFL’s public relations program to 
persuade the fans of the validity of their position, and divide 
and frustrate the players by proceeding with the regular 
schedule, using strikebreakers.544  These tactics proved to be 
effective.545  As the strike continued, public opinion favored 
the owners, and player solidarity quickly eroded.546  Al-
though eighty-four percent of the players remained on strike 
for its duration, several veteran players crossed the lines as 
early as the first week.547  Furthermore, when the strike was 
called off, it appeared that many players had been on the 
verge of crossing the lines.548  On October 15, 1987 the strike 
ended without reaching a new agreement.549  The league de-
clared an impasse in the negotiations, and thus continued to 
operate under the terms of the 1982 agreement.550 
The NFLPA filed an antitrust suit against the league as 
the strike ended.551  In Powell v. National Football League,552 
the NFLPA employed antitrust tactics to challenge the col-
lege draft and restraints of free agency, such as the RFR/C 
system.553  The NFLPA argued that the nonstatutory labor 
exemption to the Sherman Act did not apply after the expira-
tion of an agreement, and that the owners’ application of the 
 
543. Id.; cf. Lock, supra note 471, at 408 (noting the dramatic increase in 
player salaries during the existence of the USFL:  “[t]he tremendous mismatch in 
bargaining strengths between the NFL and NFLPA is due to the cumulative ef-
fect of the lack of intra- and inter-league competition for player services”). 
544. STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 79. 
545. See id. at 79-80. 
546. See id. at 79-81. 
547. Id. at 81. 
548. Id. 
549. Truelock, supra note 20, at 1931. 
550. See id. 
551. Id. at 1932. 
552. 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988), rev’d, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991). 
553. Id. at 777. 
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1982 agreement’s terms therefore fell outside of the exemp-
tion.554  A federal district court in Minnesota agreed with the 
players, holding that the nonstatutory labor exemption had 
expired when the 1987 collective bargaining negotiations 
reached an impasse.555  Thus, the league’s restrictive prac-
tices were subject to antitrust scrutiny so long as the league 
operated without a CBA.556  The Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals overruled the decision, holding that the nonstatutory 
labor exception survived the impasse.557  The court con-
cluded that federal labor law, not antitrust law, applied.558  
The court reasoned that the remedies and procedures avail-
able under the labor laws provided sufficient protection to 
the parties and precluded the application of antitrust laws.559 
 
554. Id. at 778. 
555. Id. at 788.  The court concluded: 
[P]roper accommodation of labor and antitrust interests requires that a 
labor exemption relating to a mandatory bargaining subject survive ex-
piration of the collective bargaining agreement until the parties reach 
impasse as to that issue; thereafter, the term or condition is no longer 
immune from scrutiny under the antitrust laws, and the employer runs 
the risk that continued imposition of the condition will subject the em-
ployer to liability. 
Id. 
556. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 788. 
557. Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).  The court, although it recognized that manage-
ment is not forever exempt from antitrust laws once a CBA is in place, did not 
establish exactly when the nonstatutory labor exemption might terminate.  Id. at 
1303.  In addressing this issue, the court stated:  “As long as there is a possibility 
that proceedings may be commenced before the National Labor Relations Board, 
or until final resolution of Board proceedings and appeals therefrom, the labor 
relationship continues and the labor exemption applies.”  Id. at 1303-04. 
558. Id. at 1295. 
559. Id. at 1300-03.  In regard to the procedures available under labor laws, 
the court found that:  (1) there is a continuing obligation to bargain in good faith; 
(2) there is an obligation to maintain current wages and working conditions prior 
to impasse; and (3) once impasse is reached, employers may only impose new or 
different terms that are reasonably contemplated within the scope of the pre-
impasse proposals.  Powell, 930 F.2d at 1300-03.  With regard to the remedies 
available under the labor laws, the court found that:  (1) the union can strike; (2) 
the employer can lock out the employees; and (3) the parties may petition the 
NLRB for a cease and desist order prohibiting conduct constituting and unfair 
labor practice.  Id. at 1302. 
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During the pendancy of the Powell litigation, however, 
the NFL owners offered the NFLPA a choice of two free 
agency plans.560  In February, 1989, when negotiations over 
free agency failed, the owners unilaterally implemented the 
second proposal, known as Plan B.561  Under Plan B, each 
NFL team could protect thirty-seven players on its roster, 
leaving the others free to negotiate with other teams.562  The 
protected players, however, remained subject to the RFR/C 
system that applied in the 1977 and 1982 CBAs.563  In addi-
tion, because each NFL team was allowed a forty-seven 
player roster,564 the resulting quality of the unrestricted 
players was very low.565  In the first season following the 
implementation of Plan B, only 229 of the 619 unrestricted 
players switched teams.566  Conversely, not one protected 
player changed teams during the same period.567  Thus, as 
one commentator has observed, Plan B, although not as 
broad as the RFR/C system, still restricted a substantial 
number of players from freely switching teams.568 
On December 5, 1989, the members of the NFLPA voted 
to decertify the organization in an effort to overcome the 
nonstatutory labor exemption.569  Less than five months 
later, a group of players, led by New York Jets running back 
Freeman McNeil, filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL 
 
560. Truelock, supra note 20, at 1938. 
561. Id. 
562. Id.; GORMAN & CALHOUN, supra note 344, at 162. 
563. Truelock, supra note 20, at 1938. 
564. Id. 
565. See id.; GORMAN & CALHOUN, supra note 344, at 162. 
566. Craig Neff, A Semiopen Field, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 10, 1989, at 14.  
In fact, in the first year Plan B was implemented, fewer than half of the eligible 
players gained an active roster spot by opening day.  GORMAN & CALHOUN, supra 
note 344, at 162. 
567. Neff, supra note 566, at 14. 
568. Truelock, supra note 20, at 1938. 
569. See Bernard Pellegrino, Assessing the Impact of the NFL Free Agency Com-
promise in McNeil v. National Football League, 11 SUM. ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 3 
(1993); Dickerson, supra note 70, at 175. 
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in McNeil v. National Football League.570  The players alleged 
that the Plan B free agency system violated antitrust law.571  
The NFL answered by asserting immunity from the antitrust 
challenge under the nonstatutory labor exemption.572  The 
NFL also argued that, under the “single entity” defense, Plan 
B did not violate the antitrust laws because its members 
functioned as a single economic entity, and therefore, were 
incapable of forming illegal combinations within the mean-
ing of the Sherman Act.573  The McNeil court, applying the 
Mackey test,574 held that the nonstatutory labor exemption 
did not apply.575  The court reasoned that there was no “on-
going labor relationship” between the owners and players 
because the NFLPA had decertified itself as the players’ col-
lective bargaining representative of the players, and the con-
tracts referred to in the suit were created after decertifica-
tion.576  In addition, the McNeil court rejected the NFL’s 
“single entity” defense.577  Thus, the NFL was no longer pro-
tected by the nonstatutory labor exemption.578 
As a result of these holdings, the ultimate question of an-
titrust liability fell to the trier of fact.579  At the close of the 
trial, the court instructed the jury that the Sherman Act ap-
plied to Plan B; consequently the jury returned a verdict in 
favor of the players on the grounds that Plan B violated Sec-
tion One of the Sherman Act and awarded the plaintiffs 
$543,000.580  Specifically, the jury found that Plan B substan-
tially harmed competition for the services of professional 
 
570. 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992). 
571. Id. at 875. 
572. Id. at 884. 
573. Id. at 878. 
574. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 606. 
575. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 888. 
576. Id. at 885-87. 
577. Id. at 880. 
578. Id. at 886. 
579. Id. at 883. 
580. McNeil v. National Football League, Civ. No. 4-90-476, 1992 WL 
315292, at *1-3 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1992). 
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football players.581  In addition, the jury decided that, al-
though Plan B contributed to the competitive balance in the 
NFL, it was more restrictive than necessary to maintain that 
balance.582  Finally, the jury found that the plaintiffs had suf-
fered economic injury as a direct result of Plan B.583  The 
players had won their first antitrust battle. 
On September 21, 1992, less than two weeks after the 
verdict in McNeil, five NFL players filed a class action chal-
lenging various NFL player rules and restraints.584  Under 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel,585 the NFL would have 
been estopped from denying liability for the imposition of 
Plan B; as a result, the league would thereby be liable to pay 
damages in the area of $211 million.586  The players and 
owners, realizing the potential consequences of the class ac-
tion, began negotiating a settlement agreement and a new 
CBA.587  On January 6, 1993, the NFL and the players 
reached a tentative agreement to settle their dispute through 
a seven year contract, thus ending the league’s five-year pe-
riod of operation without a CBA.588 
On May 6, 1993, the NFLPA and the NFL agreed on the 
terms of both a new CBA and a Stipulation and Settlement 
Agreement concerning the outstanding cases.589  The cur-
rently applicable 1993 CBA (“1993 Agreement” or “Agree-
ment”), which became effective on March 31, 1993, incorpo-
 
581. Id. at *1 (answering question of fact number one). 
582. Id. (answering questions of fact numbers two and three). 
583. Id. (answering questions of fact numbers four and five). 
584. White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (D. Minn. 
1993). 
585. Collateral estoppel is defined as a “[p]rior judgment between same par-
ties on [a] different cause of action . . . as to those matters in issue or points con-
troverted, on determination of which finding or verdict was rendered.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 282, at 261. 
586. Truelock, supra note 20, at 1944-45. 
587. See id. at 1945. 
588. Gerald Eskenazi, N.F.L. Labor Accord Is Reached Allowing Free Agency For 
Players, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at A1. 
589. See Truelock, supra note 20, at 1945. 
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rates the terms of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement 
concerning free agency.590  The 1993 Agreement covers seven 
seasons, from 1993 to 1999,591 and broadens free agency by 
making all players with a minimum of five years of league 
experience592 unrestricted free agents once their contracts 
expire.593  There are, however, restrictions to free agency 
drafted into the agreement.  In the first year of the Agree-
ment, each NFL team was allowed to exclude one “Franchise 
Player” from the free agent pool, and had the right of first re-
fusal on two other players, considered “Transition Play-
ers.”594  In order to offset the “Franchise Player’s” loss of 
freedom to negotiate as a free agent, the team must offer this 
player a contract with compensation that equals or exceeds 
the greater of either the average salary of the top five highest 
paid players at his position, or 120% of his prior years sal-
ary.595  Similarly, the team must offer the “Transition Play-
ers” contracts with compensation that equals or exceeds the 
greater of either the average salary of the top ten highest 
paid players at his position, or 120% of his prior year’s sal-
ary.596  In the second year of the agreement, teams were 
 
590. See White, 822 F. Supp. at 1412-13; see also NFL Collective Bargaining 
Agreement 1993-2000 arts. XIX, XX [hereinafter 1993 Agreement]. 
591. NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 1993-2000 art. LVIII. 
592. The agreement also specified that the five year free agency eligibility 
requirement would be reduced in 1994 to four years.  GORMAN & CALHOUN, supra 
note 344, at 163. 
593. 1993 Agreement art. XIX; see GORMAN & CALHOUN, supra note 344, at 
162.  Immediately following the agreement, 360 eligible players were declared 
free agents.  Id. 
594. 1993 Agreement art. XX 1, 3.  The RFR/C used for Transition Players 
here is similar in operation to that under the previous RFR/C system.  See supra 
notes 505-07 and accompanying text (discussing the RFR/C system).  There are, 
however, two differences.  First, the new RFR/C system applies only to “Re-
stricted Free Agents,” those veteran players who have played at least three, but 
less than five, years, and “Transition Players.”  1993 Agreement arts. XIX 2, XX 
3(b).  Second, the qualifying offer amounts, which represent the minimum dollar 
amounts that must be tendered in order to invoke the RFR/C system, have been 
substantially raised.  Id. art. XIX 2(b). 
595. 1993 Agreement art. XX 2(c); see Truelock, supra note 20, at 1946; Pelle-
grino, supra note 569, at 3; Dickerson, supra note 70, at 201-03. 
596. 1993 Agreement art. XX 4(a); see Truelock, supra note 20, at 1946. 
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permitted to name one “Franchise Player” and one “Transi-
tion Player.”597  Except in 1999, when each team will be per-
mitted to designate one “Transition Player” in addition to 
the “Franchise Player,” each team will be able to name only a 
“Franchise Player” in each season after the second year of the 
agreement.598 
The 1993 Agreement, in addition to the franchise and 
transition limitations, restricts player mobility by imple-
menting a salary cap.599  The salary cap limits player salaries 
and benefits to sixty-seven percent of the NFL’s gross reve-
nues.600  The salary cap, however, is only effective from 1994 
to 1998.601  This delay in the application of the salary cap was 
designed to allow the league and the teams to become com-
fortable with the concept of free agency.602 
Initially, free agency brought substantial financial bene-
fits and mobility to players.603  Approximately 120 players 
changed teams during the free agency period in 1993.604  
These players enjoyed average pay raises in excess of 
125%.605  Despite these early gains, however, the long term 
effect of the salary cap served to hinder salary growth and 
restrict player mobility.606  These effects have been mani-
fested in several areas.  First, free agent movement has been 
restricted because acquiring teams have been forced to fit 
 
597. 1993 Agreement art. XX 3(a); see Truelock, supra note 20, at 1946. 
598. 1993 Agreement art. XX 3(a); see Truelock, supra note 20, at 1946. 
599. See Truelock, supra note 20, at 1946. 
600. See Truelock, supra note 20, at 1946; GORMAN & CALHOUN, supra note 
344, at 163.  Once player salaries and benefits reach 67% of N.F.L. gross revenues, 
the percentage allowed to be expended the following years falls to 64% the next 
year, then 63% the next year, and finally 62% for each year thereafter.  Truelock, 
supra note 20, at 1946-47. 
601. See Truelock, supra note 20, at 1947. 
602. Id. 
603. See Pellegrino, supra note 569, at 4. 
604. Peter King, The League of the Free, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 26, 1993, at 
32. 
605. Truelock, supra note 20, at 1948. 
606. See Dickerson, supra note 70, at 184-85; Pellegrino, supra note 569, at 5-6. 
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new players within their salary cap.607  Second, the salary 
cap has had an immediate effect on several veteran players 
who were forced to take pay cuts or were released because 
of their team’s difficulty fitting under the salary cap.608  
Third, commentators predict that player salary escalation 
will begin to level off as teams struggle to stay within their 
salary caps.609  Finally, the average salary for players in the 
lowest quarter of the league’s talent pool is predicted to 
drop.610  It is argued that this will occur because teams will 
nonetheless pay their top players millions each year, and 
consequently be forced to save salary cap room by paying 
less for reserves and substitutes.611  Thus, the 1993 Agree-
ment’s grant of free agency has been a misnomer;612  al-
though the Agreement gives players the opportunity to be-
come free agents, it restricts their ability to market 
themselves freely throughout the league.613 
III. LABOR LAW AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ARE THE 
CURRENT DRIVING FORCE BEHIND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 
IN BASEBALL AND FOOTBALL:  BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST 
EXEMPTION IS A “DEAD-LETTER” 
Today, collective bargaining and the principles of labor 
law define employment relations in professional sports.  As 
the prevalence of collective bargaining has increased in 
shaping the employment relationship between owners and 
 
607. Pellegrino, supra note 569, at 5-6. 
608. Dickerson, supra note 70, at 185.  For example, New York Giants all-pro 
quarterback Phil Simms, voted Most Valuable Player in Super Bowl XXI, signed 
a two-year contract in 1993 that increased his average annual salary by $900,000.  
Id.  However, in 1994, Simms was released because his salary, which the Giants 
had willingly paid in the 1993 non-salary cap year, was now too high in the 1994 
salary cap year.  Id.  San Francisco Forty-Niner Jamie Williams was forced to ac-
cept a 59% pay cut in order to continue playing in the NFL.  Id. 
609. Pellegrino, supra note 569, at 5-6. 
610. Id. at 6. 
611. Id. 
612. See id. at 5-7; Dickerson, supra note 70, at 201-03. 
613. Dickerson, supra note 70, at 201-03. 
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players,614 the importance of antitrust principles has de-
clined.615  As a result, Part III of this Note argues that profes-
sional baseball’s antitrust immunity has eroded to the point 
where it is a “dead-letter” in employment relations in profes-
sional sports.  First, this part examines the current state of 
antitrust law in defining employment relations by compar-
ing the history of antitrust challenges in baseball and foot-
ball.  Second, this part argues that collective bargaining and 
labor law have supplanted antitrust law as the driving force 
behind defining the terms of the employment relationship in 
professional sports.  Finally, this Note concludes that base-
ball’s antitrust exemption has become a “dead-letter” in de-
fining the relationship between owners and players in pro-
fessional sports. 
A. The Current Role of Antitrust Law in Professional Sports 
Employment Relations:  A Comparative Analysis of the 
History of Antitrust Challenges in Baseball and Football 
This section analyzes the current role of antitrust law in 
professional sports employment relations by comparing the 
history of antitrust challenges in baseball and football.  First 
this section examines the limited history of antitrust chal-
lenges in football.  Second, this section discusses the more 
extensive history of antitrust challenges in baseball.  Finally, 
this section concludes that antitrust law does not currently 
play an active role in defining employment relations in ei-
ther sport. 
1. Antitrust Challenges in Football 
Professional football has always been subject to federal 
antitrust law.  During the 1950s, courts rejected the NFL’s ef-
 
614. Compare supra notes 229-387 and accompanying text (discussing collec-
tive bargaining in baseball) with supra notes 436-82, 505-50, 589-613 and accom-
panying text (discussing collective bargaining in football). 
615. Compare supra notes 156-202 and accompanying text (discussing the de-
velopment of baseball’s antitrust exemption) with supra notes 229-387 and ac-
companying text (discussing collective bargaining and labor law in baseball). 
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forts to obtain antitrust immunity.616  In United States v. Na-
tional Football League, a federal court in Pennsylvania indi-
rectly impeded the NFL’s efforts by holding that the 
league’s exclusive broadcast rights provision was subject to 
antitrust constraints.617  Ultimately, the Supreme Court, in 
Radovich, emphatically quashed the NFL’s attempts.618  The 
Radovich court held that the antitrust exemption delineated 
in Federal Baseball was expressly limited to professional base-
ball.619  After Radovich, the NFL owners abandoned their 
quest for antitrust immunity and focused their efforts on in-
creasing their bargaining strength.620  Thus, after Radovich, 
the NFL was forced to operate under the same antitrust con-
straints as any other business in the United States.621 
2. Antitrust Challenges in Baseball 
Baseball, unlike football, has been exempt from antitrust 
laws for the majority of its existence, but the fundamental ra-
tionale of baseball’s antitrust exemption has been slowly 
eroded by the courts.  In contrast to football, the Supreme 
Court held in Federal Baseball that professional baseball was 
 
616. See discussion supra part II.A (discussing the NFL’s attempts to gain 
antitrust immunity). 
617. United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 327-28 
(E.D. Pa. 1953); see supra notes 398-404 and accompanying text (discussing Na-
tional Football). 
618. See supra notes 405-09 and accompanying text (discussing Radovich). 
619. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957). 
620. See supra notes 436-613 and accompanying text (discussing the history 
of employment relations in football after Radovich). 
621. See Radovich, 352 U.S. at 452 (holding that football is within the protec-
tion of the Sherman Act); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 82 
(N.D. Cal. 1974), aff’d, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979) 
(holding that the Rozelle Rule violates antitrust laws); Mackey v. National Foot-
ball League, 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) 
(holding that the Rozelle Rule violates antitrust law); Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 
F. Supp. 738, 744 (D.D.C. 1976), modified, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding 
that football’s college draft violates the Sherman Act); supra notes 436-613 and 
accompanying text (illustrating the interplay between antitrust laws and collec-
tive bargaining in the history of employment relations between owners and 
players in football). 
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immune from antitrust laws.622  Underlying the Federal Base-
ball decision was the Court’s determination that professional 
baseball did not involve interstate commerce.623  The reason-
ing of Federal Baseball, however, was gradually undermined, 
as it became clear that the reasoning behind it was out-
dated.624  The erosion of the Federal Baseball rationale is illus-
trated by three subsequent challenges to baseball’s exemp-
tion:  Gardella, Toolson, and Flood. 
The clearest expressions of the problems that arose from 
Federal Baseball were articulated by the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit in Gardella.625  The Gardella court stated 
that the Federal Baseball decision did not address the possibil-
ity that the nature of baseball would change over time.626  
The Second Circuit noted that when games were broadcast 
on radio and television, the business of baseball assumed an 
interstate element that the Federal Baseball Court had not con-
sidered.627  Since the court in Federal Baseball examined base-
ball before games were broadcast, its reasoning failed to 
consider the implications of interstate broadcast on the char-
acterization of the sport as intrastate or interstate com-
merce.628 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Frank argued that a sig-
nificant expansion of the definition of interstate commerce 
 
622. See Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922). 
623. See Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208-09 (holding that professional base-
ball is purely a state affair). 
624. See, e.g., Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 412 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the rationale of Federal Baseball was repudiated by the 
Supreme Court’s expansion of the definition of interstate commerce); Toolson v. 
New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357, reh’g granted, 346 U.S. 917 (1953) 
(holding that only Congress can subject baseball to antitrust constraints); Flood 
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-83 (1972) (conceding that the reasoning of Federal Base-
ball is no longer valid). 
625. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text (discussing Gardella). 
626. Gardella, 172 F.2d at 407-08. 
627. Id. 
628. See Gardella, 172 F. 2d at 407-08; see also Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208-
09. 
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had undermined the reasoning underpinning the Federal 
Baseball decision.629  Specifically, Judge Frank noted that by 
1949 the Supreme Court had extended the definition of in-
terstate commerce to encompass services.630  This expansion 
repudiated the Federal Baseball court’s reasoning that base-
ball games involved services, and that traveling from game 
to game was merely incident to those services.631  As a result, 
Judge Frank concluded that the rationale of Federal Baseball 
should be limited to the insufficiency of traveling to estab-
lish the presence of interstate commerce.632 
In Toolson, the Supreme Court subsequently failed to re-
spond to the issues raised in Gardella and upheld Federal 
Baseball on stare decisis grounds.633  The Court in Toolson, 
rather than addressing Federal Baseball directly, deflected the 
issue to Congress.634  The Court reasoned that baseball’s ex-
emption had been in place too long to be overruled by any-
one other than Congress.635 
Finally, the Supreme Court once again upheld Federal 
Baseball in it’s 1972 Flood decision.636  The Flood Court, how-
ever, acknowledged that the narrow definition of interstate 
commerce employed in Federal Baseball was no longer valid, 
and that baseball was a business which was engaged in in-
terstate commerce under its contemporary definition.637  In 
addition, the Flood Court again refused to rule on baseball’s 
exemption; instead the Court noted that any incongruity or 
“inconsistency” should be resolved by Congress, not the 
Court.638 
 




633. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357, reh’g granted, 346 U.S. 917 (1953). 
634. Id. 
635. Id. 
636. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. 
637. Id. 
638. Id. at 284. 
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3. Antitrust Law Does Not Currently Play an Active 
Role in Defining Employment Relations in Either 
Baseball or Football 
The Flood decision marked the end of the active signifi-
cance of baseball’s antitrust exemption in employment rela-
tions between owners and players.639  In fact, Flood marks the 
final invocation of baseball’s exemption in the context of 
employment relations.640  Baseball players, after fifty years 
and two defeats in the Supreme Court, looked to other legal 
means of protecting their interests.641  Conversely, the own-
ers, for whom the exemption had become a comfortable 
precedent, realized that it rested on the shakiest of grounds 
and became hesitant to use it.642  Thus, after 1972, baseball 
and football conducted employment relations on common 
ground:  collective bargaining and labor law.643 
B. Labor Law and Collective Bargaining:  The Current       
Driving Force Behind Employment Relations in Baseball 
and Football 
Baseball’s antitrust exemption does not provide its own-
ers with an advantage over football owners, because collec-
tive bargaining and labor law currently define the employ-
ment relationship in both sports.  In football, this has been 
the case since the 1950s, when football players first union-
 
639. See supra note 198 (illustrating that invocations of baseball’s antitrust 
exemption in courts after Flood are limited to matters outside of the employment 
relationship between owners and players). 
640. See supra note 198 (illustrating that every use of the exemption since 
Flood has been in cases that deal with matters outside of the employment rela-
tionship). 
641. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text (discussing the players’ 
decision to look for new ways to advance their interests after Flood); see also notes 
229-387 and accompanying text (discussing collective bargaining and labor law 
in baseball). 
642. See supra note 198 (showing that since Kuhn, baseball’s exemption has 
only been raised in cases involving issues outside of the employment relation-
ship). 
643. Compare supra notes 436-613 and accompanying text (discussing collec-
tive bargaining and labor law in football) with supra notes 223-387 and accompa-
nying text (discussing collective bargaining and labor law in baseball). 
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ized.644  Conversely, professional baseball, which was not 
subject to NLRB jurisdiction until 1969,645 did not reach its 
first CBA until 1968.646  This section analyzes the emergence 
of collective bargaining and labor law as the primary impe-
tus behind employment relations in football and baseball.  
First, this section examines the history of collective bargain-
ing and labor law in football employment relations.  Second, 
this section surveys the history of collective bargaining and 
labor law in baseball employment relations.  Finally, this sec-
tion concludes that baseball’s antitrust exemption is a “dead-
letter” because collective bargaining and labor law currently 
define the employment relationship in both football and 
baseball. 
1. Labor Law and Collective Bargaining in Football 
 Collective bargaining and labor law have defined the 
employment relationship in football since the 1950s.647  The 
NFL, which failed to obtain antitrust immunity from the 
courts, has been forced to engage in collective bargaining 
with its players since they first unionized in 1956.648  Al-
though there were a number of significant antitrust chal-
lenges during this period,649 collective bargaining and labor 
 
644. BERRY, supra note 20, at 96, 124. 
645. See supra notes 224-25 (discussing the umpires’ case). 
646. Chalian, supra note 20, at 606. 
647. See supra part II.A (discussing the NFL’s failure to gain antitrust immu-
nity); supra part II.C (discussing the history of employment relations between 
owners and players in the NFL since the players unionized in 1956). 
648. See supra part II.A (examining the rejection of the NFL’s efforts to ob-
tain antitrust immunity in National Football and Radovich); supra part II.C (survey-
ing the history of employment relations in football since the formation of the 
NFLPA). 
649. See, e.g., Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 82 (holding that the Rozelle Rule violates 
federal antitrust law as an unreasonable restraint of trade); Mackey v. National 
Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (D. Minn 1975), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (holding that the 
Rozelle Rule constituted an illegal restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman 
Act, rejecting the league’s contention that the rule was protected by the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption and establishing a three prong standard for application of 
the nonstatutory labor exemption); Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 744 (holding that the 
NFL’s college draft violated the Sherman Act, and rejecting the contention that 
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law have remained the primary impetus in defining the em-
ployment relationship.650  This is due largely to the disparity 
between the bargaining strength of the owners and play-
ers.651  Football players, due to their relatively weak bargain-
ing power,652 have been unable to exploit their antitrust vic-
tories in subsequent collective bargaining negotiations.653  
The NFLPA’s repeated failures to maintain a united front in 
negotiations and labor stoppages has allowed the owners to 
dictate the terms of the employment relationship.654  Conse-
quently, the owners negotiated one-sided agreements that 
                                                                                                                                  
the draft is protected by the nonstatutory labor exemption); Powell v. National 
Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 
(1991) (holding that the nonstatutory labor exemption survives a negotiations 
impasse so long as there is a possibility of proceedings before the NLRB); McNeil 
v. National Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 886 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that 
the nonstatutory labor exemption did not apply after the NFLPA decertified). 
650. See, e.g., supra notes 439-43 and accompanying text (discussing the 1968 
strike); supra notes 444-49 and accompanying text (discussing the 1970 work 
stoppage and subsequent agreement); supra notes 467-70 and accompanying text 
(discussing the 1974 strike); supra notes 473-78 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the 1975 strike); supra notes 505-07 and accompanying text (discussing the 
1977 CBA); supra notes 512-39 and accompanying text (discussing the 1982 strike 
and subsequent CBA); supra notes 541-50 and accompanying text (discussing the 
1987 strike); supra notes 589-613 and accompanying text (discussing the 1993 
CBA). 
651. This disparity is illustrated by the NFLPA’s fortune in work stoppages 
and collective bargaining negotiations.  See, e.g., supra note 438 and accompany-
ing text (discussing aborted strike attempts in 1956 and 1959 due to weak players 
solidarity); supra notes 467-70 and accompanying text (discussing the unsuccess-
ful 1974 strike, which failed after many players crossed the picket lines and pub-
lic support swayed in favor of the owners); supra notes 473-78 and accompanying 
text (discussing the 1975 strike by independent teams); supra notes 505-09 and 
accompanying text (discussing the 1977 CBA, in which the NFLPA negotiated 
away the fruits of its antitrust victory in Mackey by accepting the RFR/C system); 
supra notes 541-50 and accompanying text (discussing the failed 1987 strike 
which was called off when player solidarity dissolved); supra notes 589-613 and 
accompanying text (discussing the 1993 CBA, which features a salary cap). 
652. See supra note 651 and accompanying text (illustrating the weakness of 
the NFLPA by examining its fortunes in collective bargaining negotiations and 
work stoppages). 
653. See supra notes 503-09 and accompanying text (discussing the 1977 
CBA, in which the NFLPA’s agreed to another reserve system, the RFR/C sys-
tem, in the wake of its victory over the Rozelle Rule in Mackey). 
654. See supra note 651 (illustrating the NFLPA’s repeated failures in work 
stoppages and collective bargaining negotiations). 
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were immunized against antitrust challenge by the nonstatu-
tory labor exception.655 
The Rozelle Rule provides the clearest example of the 
plight of the NFLPA during this period.656  The NFLPA’s at-
tempts to eliminate the Rozelle Rule with strikes in 1974 and 
1975 failed quietly.657  It was not until the NFLPA returned 
to antitrust litigation that the Rozelle Rule was invali-
dated.658  In Mackey, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that the Rozelle Rule did not qualify for the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption.659  Therefore, the Mackey court applied 
an antitrust analysis to the Rozelle Rule, and held that it vio-
lated the Sherman Act.660  In the wake of this antitrust vic-
tory, however, the NFLPA, failed to fortify its gains.661  In-
stead, the NFLPA negotiated the 1977 CBA, which provided 
for the RFR/C free agency system, a virtual reincarnation of 
the Rozelle Rule.662 
The NFLPA’s weakness persisted until the players voted 
to decertify the union in 1989.663  In McNeil, the court held 
that decertification terminated the labor relationship be-
tween owners and players.664  This effectively rendered the 
owners most useful tool, the nonstatutory labor exemption, 
 
655. See discussion supra part II.B (discussing the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion). 
656. See supra notes 455-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Rozelle 
Rule). 
657. See supra notes 465-77 and accompanying text (discussing the NFLPA’s 
unsuccessful strikes in 1974 and 1975). 
658. See Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 82 (holding that the Rozelle Rule violates fed-
eral antitrust law as an unreasonable restraint of trade); Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 
1007 (holding that the Rozelle Rule constituted an illegal restraint of trade in vio-
lation of the Sherman Act, rejecting the league’s contention that the rule was pro-
tected by the nonstatutory labor exemption.). 
659. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616. 
660. Id. at 622. 
661. See Chalian, supra note 20, at 616; BERRY, supra note 20, at 127; 
STAUDOHAR, supra note 214, at 79. 
662. See supra notes 505-09 and accompanying text (discussing the RFR/C 
system). 
663. See Pellegrino, supra note 569, at 3. 
664. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 886-87. 
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useless.665  Following McNeil, neither the owners nor the 
players approached negotiations with a legal advantage over 
the other.666  Thus, after a cavalcade of unsuccessful strikes 
in 1968, 1970, 1974, 1982, and 1987, football players finally 
achieved relatively equal bargaining strength with the own-
ers.667 
Today, football owners possess relatively stronger bar-
gaining power than the players, despite the loss of the non-
statutory labor exemption.668  Nevertheless, after McNeil, 
both the owners and players enter negotiations on the same 
legal footing.669  The rules of collective bargaining and labor 
law, therefore, define the parameters of their employment 
relationship. 
2. Labor Law and Collective Bargaining in Baseball 
Labor law and collective bargaining currently define the 
employment relationship in professional baseball.  Once the 
NLRB found professional baseball to be within its jurisdic-
tion,670 the relationship between the MLBPA and the owners 
became centered on collective bargaining.671  Thus, all of the 
major changes in the employment relationship during the 
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s were achieved through arbitration, 
 
665. See id. at 886. 
666. See id. at 886 (concluding that football is no longer protected by the 
nonstatutory labor exemption); see also supra notes 589-613 and accompanying 
text (discussing the terms of the 1993 CBA). 
667. See supra part II.C (discussing the repeated failures of the NFLPA in 
work stoppages); see also supra notes 589-613 and accompanying text (discussing 
the 1993 CBA). 
668. This disparity in relative bargaining strength is directly attributable to 
the players’ continued inability to remain unified.  See supra part II.C (discussing 
the players repeated failure to remain unified).  The persistence of this disparity 
is clearly demonstrated by the 1993 CBA, which restricts player mobility with a 
salary cap and several other measures.  See supra notes 589-602 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the terms of the 1993 CBA). 
669. See McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 886 (holding that the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption no longer protects the NFL). 
670. See supra notes 224-25 (discussing the umpires’ case). 
671. See discussion supra part I.C.2 (discussing the history of employment 
relations between owners and players since the formation of the MLBPA). 
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negotiations, and union pressure tactics.672 
The elimination of the reserve rule673 was the most sig-
nificant victory by baseball players during this period.674  
The reserve rule, which hindered player mobility since base-
ball’s inception in the 1870s, had withstood challenges in the 
courts under contract law675 and antitrust law.676  Ultimately, 
however, the reserve rule was eliminated in a grievance arbi-
tration hearing677 which had been secured through collective 
bargaining.678 
The demise of the reserve system focused the attention of 
both owners and players on collective bargaining, as it be-
came clear that any significant changes would result from 
 
672. See, e.g., supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text (discussing in-
creases in minimum salaries, pension benefits, and average salaries during 
Marvin Miller’s first years as executive director of the MLBPA); supra notes 264-
72 and accompanying text (discussing the elimination of the reserve rule in the 
Messersmith and McNally arbitration); supra notes 320-25 and accompanying 
text (discussing the free agent compensation plan implemented by the 1981 
agreement); supra notes 326-42 and accompanying text (discussing the 1985 nego-
tiations and 1985 strike; the 1981 compensation plan was abandoned, the owners 
demands for a salary cap were rescinded, minimum salaries were increased, 
players were granted a portion of television revenues, and the service require-
ment for salary arbitration was reduced); supra notes 343-48 and accompanying 
text (discussing the effect of free agency on player salaries). 
673. See supra notes 264-72 and accompanying text (discussing the elimina-
tion of the reserve rule in the Messersmith and McNally arbitration). 
674. See supra notes 343-48 and accompanying text (discussing the dramatic 
escalation of player salaries after the advent of free agency). 
675. See supra part I.A (discussing challenges to the reserve system under 
contract law principles in Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890); Metropolitan Exhibition Co. v. Ward, 9 N.Y.S. 779 (Sup. Ct. 
1890); Philadelphia Base Ball Club, Ltd. v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (Pa. Sup. 
Ct. 1902)). 
676. See supra part I.B (discussing antitrust challenges to the reserve rule in 
Chase, Federal Baseball, Gardella, Toolson, and Flood). 
677. See supra notes 264-72 (discussing the elimination of the reserve rule in 
the Messersmith and McNally arbitration hearing). 
678. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text (discussing grievance ar-
bitration provision in 1970 CBA); see also Kansas City Royals Baseball Corpora-
tion v. Major League Baseball Players’ Association, 532 F.2d 615, 629 (8th Cir. 
1976) (holding that the grievance arbitration provision expressly authorized the 
arbitration of grievances relating to the reserve system). 
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such negotiations.679  Thereafter, disputes over free agency, 
salaries, the amateur draft, pensions, and any other matter 
relating to the employment relationship in professional 
baseball were resolved through collective bargaining power 
struggles between the owners and players.680 
Due to the relatively equal bargaining strength of the 
owners and players, their power struggles were most visibly 
manifested in the numerous work stoppages the sport has 
endured.681  Although the specific issues of each confronta-
tion have differed, the dynamics of the conflicts have re-
mained the same:  the owners sought to limit free agency 
and retard salary growth, the players tried to increase their 
mobility, salaries, and benefits, and the two sides eventually 
reached a compromise.682  For example, the 1976 collective 
bargaining negotiations, which immediately followed the 
elimination of the reserve rule, led to a lockout.683  The own-
ers feared the ramifications of unfettered free agency, and 
 
679. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (explaining the impact of the 
Kansas City Royals decision). 
680. see supra part I.C.2 (discussing the subjects of collective bargaining be-
tween the owners and players since the inception of the MLBPA). 
681. See supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text (discussing the 1976 ne-
gotiations and the 1976 lockout); supra notes 292-320 and accompanying text (ex-
amining the 1981 negotiations and the 1981 strike); supra notes 326-34 and ac-
companying text (discussing the 1985 negotiations and the 1985 strike); supra 
notes 359-72 and accompanying text (examining the 1990 negotiation, the 1990 
lockout and the settlement negotiations); supra notes 378-87 and accompanying 
text (discussing the 1994 negotiations, the 1994 strike, and the subsequent cancel-
lation of the 1994 season). 
682. See, e.g., supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text (discussing the 1976 
lockout); supra notes 292-320 and accompanying text (discussing the 1981 strike); 
supra notes 326-34 and accompanying text (discussing the 1985 strike); supra 
notes 359-72 and accompanying text (discussing the 1990 lockout); supra notes 
378-87 and accompanying text (discussing the 1994 strike).  Every work stoppage 
in baseball has ended with each party making significant concessions, with the 
exception of the 1994 strike.  See, e.g., supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text 
(discussing the terms of 1976 the agreement); supra notes 321-25 and accompany-
ing text (examining the terms of the 1981 agreement); supra notes 335-37 and ac-
companying text (discussing the terms of the 1985 agreement); supra notes 373-76 
and accompanying text (examining the terms of the 1990 agreement). 
683. See supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text (discussing the 1976 
lockout). 
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they insisted upon the establishment of limits on eligibility 
for free agency.684  The lockout ended in a compromise:685    
the players conceded to limited free agency, and the owners, 
in return, increased pension funds and minimum salary.686 
Professional baseball has endured numerous work stop-
pages since 1976.687  The 1981 strike resulted in an agreement 
that modified free agency by allowing substantial mobility 
and by providing compensation to teams losing free 
agents.688  The two-day strike in 1985 also resulted in a com-
promise.689  The owners relinquished demands for a salary 
cap and agreed to a reduced system of free agent compensa-
tion.690  The players conceded to an increased eligibility re-
quirement for salary arbitration.691  The 1990 lockout ended 
when the owners dropped their demands for a salary cap 
and the players agreed to the owners’ salary and pension 
contribution proposals.692 
Since the early 1970s, every major change in the em-
ployment relationship in baseball can be attributed to collec-
tive bargaining and labor law.693  Neither the owners nor the 
 
684. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text (discussing the owners’ 
objectives and motivations in the 1976 negotiations). 
685. See supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text (discussing the terms of 
the 1976 agreement). 
686. Id. 
687. See supra notes 292-320 and accompanying text (examining the 1981 ne-
gotiations and the 1981 strike); supra notes 326-34 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the 1985 negotiations and the 1985 strike); supra notes 359-72 and accom-
panying text (examining the 1990 negotiation, the 1990 lockout and the 
settlement negotiations); supra notes 378-87 and accompanying text (discussing 
the 1994 negotiations, the 1994 strike, and the subsequent cancellation of the 1994 
season). 
688. See supra notes 321-25 (discussing the terms of the 1981 settlement). 
689. See supra notes 335-37 and accompanying text (examining the terms of 
the 1985 settlement). 
690. Id. 
691. Id. 
692. See supra notes 373-76 and accompanying text (discussing the terms of 
the 1990 settlement). 
693. See, e.g., supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text (discussing in-
creases in minimum salaries, pension benefits, and average salaries during 
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players have evoked the exemption since Flood.694  Thus, the 
employment relationship between baseball team owners and 
baseball players is currently defined by the principles of col-
lective bargaining and labor law.695 
3. Labor Law and Collective Bargaining Currently 
Define the Employment Relationship in Football 
and Baseball 
In the 1970s, when collective bargaining and labor law 
replaced antitrust law as the defining principle of employ-
ment relations in professional sports, the antitrust exemption 
ceased to play a significant role in defining the employment 
relationships in either sport.  Given the expediency of dis-
pute resolution through labor law, collective bargaining, and 
union activities, players have no longer utilized long anti-
trust litigation as an efficient means of effecting change.696  
Consequently, antitrust litigation has been all but forsaken in 
the area of employment relations since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Flood.697  Thus, since 1972, baseball’s antitrust ex-
                                                                                                                                  
Marvin Miller’s first years as executive director of the MLBPA); supra notes 264-
72 and accompanying text (discussing the elimination of the reserve rule in the 
Messersmith and McNally arbitration); supra notes 320-25 and accompanying 
text (discussing the free agent compensation plan implemented by the 1981 
agreement); supra notes 326-42 and accompanying text (discussing the 1985 nego-
tiations and 1985 strike; the 1981 compensation plan was abandoned, the owners 
demands for a salary cap were rescinded, minimum salaries were increased, 
players were granted a portion of television revenues, and the service require-
ment for salary arbitration was reduced); supra notes 343-48 and accompanying 
text (discussing the effect of free agency on player salaries). 
694. See supra note 198 (demonstrating that every use of the antitrust exemp-
tion since Flood has dealt with issues outside of the employment relationship); see 
also notes 229-387 and accompanying text (discussing collective bargaining, labor 
law, and the history of work stoppages in baseball). 
695. See supra notes 229-387 and accompanying text (discussing employment 
relations in baseball since the inception of the MLBPA). 
696. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (explaining that the emer-
gence of collective bargaining and union tactics supplanted lengthy antitrust liti-
gation as the players’ primary avenue of challenging the owners). 
697. See supra note 198 (showing that evocations of baseball’s antitrust ex-
emption in courts since Flood have been limited to issues outside of the employ-
ment relationship). 
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emption has been moot in employment relations.698 
Although baseball owners theoretically still enjoy the ex-
emption’s protection in the courts, they are unlikely to im-
plement it in the context of the employment relationship.699  
The reasoning underlying the exemption has been exposed 
as outdated and rejected by the Court.700  Thus, the validity 
of Federal Baseball rests upon precarious ground.  The Court 
has decided to uphold Federal Baseball on the basis of stare de-
cisis, yet it openly rejects its reasoning.701  Consequently, any 
direct invocation of the exemption in the context of em-
ployment relations by the owners runs a serious risk of hav-
ing Federal Baseball overturned. 
When the NLRB found professional baseball to be within 
its jurisdiction,702 the unique status conferred onto Major 
League Baseball by Federal Baseball was reduced to existing 
in name only.  Today, professional baseball and football 
stand on relatively equal ground; the owners and players in 
each sport have relatively equal bargaining strength.703  Nei-
ther league possesses a legal advantage over the other.  
Baseball owners have abandoned the antitrust exemption in 
 
698. See supra note 198 (illustrating that the exemption has not appeared in 
antitrust litigation in the context of employment relations since 1972); see also 
Flood. 
699. See supra note 198 (demonstrating that since 1972 the antitrust exemp-
tion has only been raised in response to matters outside of the employment rela-
tionship). 
700. See generally Toolson, 346 U.S. 356; Flood, 407 U.S. 258; Gardella, 172 F.2d 
402. 
701. See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357 (upholding the exemption, but failing to dis-
cuss the rationale of Federal Baseball, and instead deferring to Congress); Flood, 
407 U.S. at 282 (acknowledging that the reasoning of Federal Baseball was no 
longer valid); see also Gardella, 172 F.2d at 407-08 (holding that the advent of tele-
vision and radio broadcasting of games changed the nature of baseball suffi-
ciently to bring it under the Sherman Act). 
702. See The American League of Professional Baseball Clubs and Associa-
tion of National Baseball League Umpires, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969). 
703. Compare supra notes 229-387 and accompanying text (discussing collec-
tive bargaining negotiations in baseball) with supra notes 436-82, 505-50, 589-613 
and accompanying text (discussing collective bargaining negotiations in foot-
ball). 
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employment relations.704  Football owners have lost the 
benefit of the nonstatutory labor exemption.705  Collective 
bargaining, governed by labor law, between relatively equal 
parties to the negotiations, is now the primary force behind 
employment relations in both sports. 
CONCLUSION 
Baseball’s antitrust exemption has been undermined in 
the courts and in practice.  The erosion of the reasoning of 
Federal Baseball, culminating in the outright rejection of the 
reasoning in Flood, left baseball’s exemption a “dead letter.”  
Although the Supreme Court rejected Federal Baseball’s rea-
soning, it refused to overrule the decision.  Instead, the 
Court deferred to Congress, which has proven to be equally 
reluctant to overturn the exemption.  So what is left of base-
ball’s antitrust exemption?  Would Federal Baseball withstand 
a direct challenge today?  These questions are unlikely to be 
answered, because in practice, the antitrust exemption is 
currently a “dead letter.”  The owners, for whom the exemp-
tion has become a comfortable precedent, realize that the ex-
emption lies on the shakiest of legal ground, and are un-
likely to jeopardize it by invoking it.  The players, who 
confronted the exemption for fifty years with lengthy anti-
trust litigation, no longer need to do so, because collective 
bargaining and labor law afford them a quicker, more effi-
cient means of advancing their interests.  Thus, the move to 
collective bargaining and labor law has allowed baseball 
players to abandon antitrust litigation, and has rendered the 
exemption a “dead letter.” 
 
 
704. See supra notes 699-701 and accompanying text (discussing baseball 
owners’ abandonment of the exemption in the context of employment relations); 
see also supra note 198 (showing that the exemption has not been evoked in the 
context of employment relations since Flood). 
705. See McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 886-87. 
